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Papuan churches: S~ecial 
Autonomy has faileCI 
The Law on Special Autonomy for West 
Papua, introduced in 2001, has been a 
total failure, say the leaders of all the main 
Protestant churches and the Catholic 
Church in Papua. In a comprehensive 
report issued on 3 May, 2007, they accuse 
the Indonesian government of showing no 
serious intent to implement special 
autonomy, which they hoped would help 
resolve the territory's problems. 
In their report which delivers its findings in strong and 
unequivocal language, the churches say that special 
autonomy, known as OTSUS, was doomed to fail from the 
start, thanks to two key documents produced by the 
authorities in Jakarta. A top-secret document from the 
Ministry of the Interior issued on 2 June 2000 instructed 
government officials to take firm action to thwart Papuan 
aspirations for independence by means of an 'Operation for 
Conditioning the Territory' and creating a communications 
network to 're-direct political trends in lrian Jaya (Papua) 
aimed at Separation from the Republic of Indonesia' . This 
was to involve military operations in all parts of the 
territory; a number of military intelligence agencies and 
army and police commands would be responsible for 
implementation. 
The second document was a report by the Secretary-
General of Indonesia's National Defence Council dated 
27 /28 May 2003 bearing the title: Strategy for Resolving 
the Conflict Regarding Separatism in the Province of Papua 
by Means of the Security Approach . 
Indonesian democracy in Papua 
According to the churches, while Indonesia claims to be a 
democracy, the kind of democracy experienced by the 
Papuan people is a fake, based on violence, terror and 
intimidation with a military face fronted by the Indonesian 
police force and its special brigade, the widely-feared 
Brimob. 
We had hoped, say the church leaders, that OTSUS 
would revitalise Papua and promote reconstruction based 
on universal values. Since the OTSUS law was enacted 
however, life for the Papuans has remained grim indeed. 
There are tight restrictions on freedom of movement. All 
activities require a police permit. Papuans lack freedom, 
justice and peace. The most recent example of the 
restrictions was on 29 March 2007 when the police in 
Jayapura refused to grant permission for a peaceful 
demonstration in the provincial capital. 
The practice of stigmatising Papuans as 'separatists' is 
still alive and well . When the churches give voice to the 
sufferings and injustice of their congregations, they are 
branded as separatists. A senior government official alleged 
on 6 February 2006 that the churches in Papua support a 
Free Papua. Such allegations throttle any efforts within the 
community to resolve the conflicts in Papua by creating a 
Land of Peace. 
Accusations against an alleged OPM leader in Mulia in 
the Central Highlands in December 2006 and the violence 
which ensued became the justification for increasing the 
military and Brimob presence. This led to a thousand 
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people fleeing their villages, while 5,000 others still suffer 
neg1lect and hunger. 
In early 2007, military units throughout the territory 
conducted indoctrination classes in all secondary schools on 
the theme of 'Education to Defend the State'. The school 
children were urged to defend the integrity of the 
Indonesian Republic . Such indoctrination resulted in 
polarising people and making it easier to incite horizontal 
conflict. 
The churches ' report devotes a special section to the 
military operations that have been conducted since OTSUS 
began . [See separate article.] 
OTSUS finances questioned 
Although a special regulation on sharing the funding 
allocated to OTSUS has been drafted, the details are 
unclear. One provision allotted funds to the churches but 
this was rescinded by the governor of Papua. He decided 
instead to allocate Rp.100 million (approx. £5,500) for each 
kampung (village) in the province, a decision that is 
condemned by the churches. They say they are much better 
placed to handle these funds because they have a well-
established administrative structure and enjoy close links 
with people who are members of the churches. Despite the 
fact that the churches have special agencies which deal 
with education, health and economic affairs, the 
government has ignored this. 
The governor has admitted that around 90 per cent of 
OTSUS funds have been used by the bureaucracy and not 
for the people, although he did not reveal how the money 
had been spent [Cenderawasih Pos, 30 May 2007] 
In recent weeks, he has been touring the province and 
visiting all the kampungs to dispense the money. It is 
Pro-referendum demo, Manokwari, 1 May 2007 -
Free West Papua Campaign 
Dutch colonialists treated dissidents who were exiled to 
Digoel in Papua. 
The best known victims are Filep Karma and Yusak 
Pakage who are now serving sentences of fifteen and ten 
years imprisonment respectively for peacefully raising the 
Morning Star flag, and Selfius Bobii, who was convicted 
with others for his alleged role in the 16 March 2006 
Abepura incident. 
The military, police and business 
Members of the Indonesian army are deeply involved in 
business ventures in Papua such as illegal logging, illegal 
fishing, exploiting the exotic, aromatic gaharu trees as well 
as panning for gold. They are also engaged in the sale of 
alcohol and the spread of HIV/AIDS 
90 per cent of OTSUS funds have been used by the by bringing to Papua women 
bureaucracy 
unclear how the expenditure of the money will be 
monitored and what measures will be put in place to avoid 
corrupt practices. 
Indonesian law and justice in Papua 
The churches highlight the many instances of Papuans 
being hunted down, imprisoned, tortured and raped, and 
the fate they suffer when cases come before the courts. 
They argue that the law can never be expected to side with 
Papuans who are always seen as the guilty party because 
they are acting against the government. 
They draw attention to investigations conducted by 
Indonesia's National Human Rights Commission, Komnas 
HAM about incidents in Wamena and Wasior and note that 
the findings never went beyond the Attorney General's 
Office, which is responsible for filing prosecutions. Hence, 
nothing has been done to bring the identified suspects to 
court. 
A glaring example of injustice is provided by the case of 
two senior police officers named by Komnas HAM for their 
involvement in the Abepura 2000 incident. Twenty-three 
other persons named in the findings submitted to the 
attorney-general were not charged . After proceedings that 
were delayed for several years, the two suspects were 
acquitted of all the charges. · 
Far from protecting the rights of Papuan people, many 
Papuans have been sent to prison, some of them in places 
far from their homeland. This is reminiscent of the way the 
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afflicted with the disease. Both the 
army and the police are able to evade 
justice when they indulge in such 
activities. They also profit from providing protection for 
foreign mining and logging companies. The military have 
been paid huge sums of money to provide protection for 
the gold and copper mine operated by Freeport. Abigail 
Abrash, a US human rights activist, estimated that as many 
as 160 Papuans were killed by the military from 1975 -
1997 in connection with protecting Freeport. [See report in 
The New York Times in December 2005.] 
The Churches are deeply concerned about the 
environmental impact of operations by Freeport and BP in 
Bintuni Bay and their effects on local people. They 
question the over-exploitation of Papua's resources by 
foreign investors. 
Much of the exploitation of Papua's timber resources is 
in the hands of a Malaysian company, the Mr Wong Group, 
which has been responsible for vast environmental damage 
and the destruction of flora, fauna, and sources of 
livelihood such as sago, dammar, and fish. 
The Papuan people have for long opposed the 
operations of Freeport. This came to a head in the Abepura 
incident on 16 March last year in which five security 
personnle were killed . The churches argue that human 
rights violations were committed by security forces and 
judicial personnel in the aftermath of the incident, yet only 
local people were rounded up and convicted. No fewer 
than 24 people were given sentences ranging from five to 
fifteen years imprisonment despite allegations of ill-
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treatment, serious abuses of their fair trial rights and a lack 
of evidence against them. 
Racial discrimination 
The churches' report cites the case of 16 March 2006 when 
Papuan students were the target of extreme brutality by 
Brimob and army intelligence agents. Yet newcomers from 
Indonesia, referred to in the report as migrants, can run 
their businesses with army and police protection. The Rev. 
Lipiyus Biniluk, a minister of the Evangelical Church (GIDI) 
is quoted as having accused Brimob members of extreme 
racialism. 'Are you here to serve the State or to murder 
Papuans? Why do you only arrest and torture Papuans 
while doing nothing to the migrants, and stand aside 
laughing while Papuans are being maltreated?' 
The migrants enjoy many privileges. They are given 
land, houses and places of worship and well-lit, asphalted 
roads are constructed. There are military or police posts at 
every location or one kilometre apart to make them feel 
safe, while Papuans are driven away and even murdered as 
alleged members of the OPM. 
Natural resources and Papuan poverty 
The Papuan people are living on a land that abounds in 
wealth, but they live in poverty because of a system that 
punishes and oppresses them. OTSUS has done nothing to 
safeguard the right to these resources or the right to life of 
the Papuans. The contracts entered into by the Indonesian 
government with Indonesian or foreign companies have 
never involved the Papuans. 
The report then turns its attention to the civil 
administration where Indonesians occupy the dominant 
positions. While the governor and district heads are 
Papuans, most of the departments are headed by migrants. 
Most of the departmental heads in the district of Jayapura, 
for example, are migrants. Of the eleven departments 
listed, eight are headed by migrants. 
The economy is also almost entirely run by migrants. 
Virtually all the key jobs in the banks, hotels, shops and 
companies are held by migrants. A UNDP report issued in 
March 2007 on the Millennium Development Goals came 
to the conclusion that Papua was the most backward of all 
the 33 provinces of Indonesia. Why is it, the report asks, 
that Papuans are confined to the kerbsides, squatting on 
banana leaves outside luxury shops and posh hotels? 
Virtually everyone working in the supermarkets and 
shopping malls are migrants. What has happened to the 
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TAPOL's change of 
name and objectives 
TAPOL is changing its name. From now 
on, we will be 1TAPOL: Promoting human 
rights, peace and democracy in 
Indonesia. 
For many years we have been 'TAPOL, the Indonesia 
Human Rights Campaign '. We have decided to change 
our name, and also our objectives, to reflect the 
democratic changes (however incomplete) in Indonesia 
today. Our objectives are now: 
' ... to support democracy in Indonesia and Timor-Leste, 
to promote all categories of human rights of their 
peoples, and to work for peaceful solutions to 
situations of conflict' . 
The new situation in Indonesia is more complex and 
requires an increasingly sophisticated approach to 
human rights and related concerns. Improvements 
have been made for example with the holding of multi-
party elections and the achievement of peace in Aceh, 
but much more remains to be achieved. Nowadays, 
while we continue with our core work of human rights 
advocacy, we also engage more with Indonesian civil 
society, politicians, policy-makers and opinion formers 
with a view to influencing policy on matters relating to 
human rights, democracy and conflict resolution. We 
are becoming more involved in peace-building 
- initiatives and the promotion of social, economic and 
cultural rights. 
We are no longer simply an adversarial human rights 
campaign and we intend by these changes to our name 
and objectives to highlight our work promoting peace, 
democracy and human rights tn generab 
Papuans whose lands were seized to make way for these 
hotels and shops? 
Health, education and culture 
The final sections of the report deal with these crucial 
aspects of life for the Papuans since the enactment of 
OTSUS. The UNDP report mentioned above reveals that 
educational facilities for the Papuans are blighted by the 
lack of teachers, books and equipment. Many of those who 
are supposed to be working as teachers also hold 
administrative posts in government offices, while others 
simply abandon their posts. 
Although the churches created many schools during the 
decades since they first arrived in Papua, these have been 
replaced by schools set up in accordance with a presidential 
instruction, which fail to conform with the needs of Papuan 
children 
Health facilities should be measured in accordance with 
what happens to mothers and children, the report argues. 
The mortality rate for Papuan women in childbirth was 
1,025/100,000, as compared with 307 /100,000 for 
Indonesian women. This mortality rate for Papuan women 
is said to be the highest in the Asian continent. 
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Infant and child mortality in Papua is the highest in 
Indonesia, namely 50.5 per one t housand births as 
compared with a national average of 43.5 per one 
thousand births. 
When Papuans fall il l, t hey have to take their 
prescriptions and purchase the medicines in pharmacies 
which are owned by Indonesian doctors. The report 
wonders what has happened to the funds allocated under 
OTSUS for the supply of medicines. It bemoans the fact 
that so many of the cl in ics that were set up by the 
Protestant and Cathol ic churches have been destroyed. 
These clinics were overwhelmed by the decision of the 
government to create Puskesmas (government clinics) , , 
where there are hardly any doctors, nurses or medicines. 
Depopulation 
The uncontrolled presence of migrants has altered the 
composition of the population . Reports by both UNICEF 
and the UNDP have concluded that the high mortality rate 
among mothers and children has resulted in depopulation 
Anti-OTSUS demo, Jaya,pura, 27 A
1
pril 2007 - Free 
West Papua Campaign 
of Sydney made public in August 2005, which raise the 
question of whether genocide is taking place in Papua. The 
legal case is difficult to make, but the findings of the two 
institutions do highlight the fact 
The high mortality rate among mothers and children 
that the survival of the Papuan 
people is endangered. The 
Churches go on to argue that 
OTSUS has been the vehicle for 
implementing the aims of the two 
has resulted in depopulation of the Papuans 
of the Papuans. This is particularly serious in the districts of 
Sarong, Merauke, Timika, Jayapura, Keerom, Nabire, Biak, 
Manokwari , Serui and Puncak Jaya. The report claims that 
the ratio between Papuans and migrants has now fallen to 
30 per cent Papuan and 70 percent migrants. (Most other 
estimates suggest the ratio is around 50-65 per cent. 
Papuans and 35-50 per cent. migrants) . It argues that a 
census is very urgent in order to provide the basis for the 
introduction of measures to safeguard the future of the 
Papuan people. 
Survival threatened 
The concluding section warns of the danger of the 
destruction of the Papuan people either through a 
deliberate policy or just letting things happen during the 44 
years since 1 May 1963 when Indonesia first took control 
of Papua. On 27 January 2006, Juan Mendez, the special 
advisor of the UN secretary general for the prevention of 
genocide, described Papua as a region of grave concern 
where the native inhabitants face the danger of extinction . 
The Indonesian authorities have refused entry to human 
rights monitors while there has been proof of violence ever 
since 1963 , he said. 
The Churches describe a process of systematic ethnic 
genocide in Papua. They refer to the report in December 
2003 by Yale University and investigations undertaken by 
the Center for Peace and Conflict Studies of the University 
continued from page 13 
Commission, received obscene messages accusing him of 
flying the Morning Star flag. On 14 June he received more 
messages warning him that his life was in danger. A number 
of men arrived in three vehicles which were parked on both 
sides of his office. When a Komnas HAM vehicle drove 
away later in the day, it was followed by one of the parked 
cars. Albert subsequently received a message on his cell-
phone from a person wanting to meet him at a nearby 
hotel. He is quite sure that the men terrorising him were 
intelligence agents who had been following the UN envoy. 
4 
documents mentioned at the beginning of the report. 
'We, the churches of Papua, convey our concerns to the 
international community and call for preventive measures 
to protect the Papuan people and safeguard their lives and 
their future as creatures of God in their homeland , the Land 
of Papua.' 
Recommendations 
The report concludes with a number of recommendations: 
a. Peaceful dialogue similar to that held in Aceh. 
b. All foreign aid for special autonomy should be frozen 
until the Indonesian government agrees to enter into 
dialogue with the Papuan people. 
c. The international community should press Indonesia 
to allow access to human rights monitors and foreign 
journalists and to human rights NGOs 
d. The US government, the European Union, Australia 
and other free countries should stop supporting 
arbitrary actions taken in the name of the integrity of 
NKRI. 
e. The churches in Papua call upon the Indonesian 
government to publicly acknowledge Papua as a Land 
of Peace. This should be accompanied by concrete 
measures such as the withdrawal of all non-organic 
troops, a halt to the construction of milita1ry bases, a 
halt to the sending of more battalions, and an end to 
military business, whether legal or illegal. 
Four human rights NGOs, lmparsial, Kontras, Pokja 
Papua (Papua Working Group) and the Legal Aid Institute 
of Indonesia, YLBHI, later issued a statement condemning 
these acts of terror. They called on the Indonesian 
government to implement their responsibilities as set out in 
UN Declaration on Human Rights Defenders of 9 
December 1998 and take action to protect the defenders. 
They called for firm action against all those who had taken 
threatening actions against human rights defenders. Their 
statement also protested against intimidatory acts by six 
members of the Indonesian army who threatened lawyers 
defending clients in a court case in Medan, North Sumatra. 
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Military presence in Papua 
underOTSUS 
According to a report by Reverend 
Socratez Sofyan Yoman, President of the 
Fellowship of West Papuan Baptist 
Churches, the international community has 
been fed false information about the 
security situation in Papua. Yoman is a 
signatory of the report by Papuan churches 
summarised elsewhere in this issue. The 
Papuan human rights organisation, 
ELSHAM has warned of the establishment 
of a new military base in Biak. 
The following is a summary of Rev Yoman's report. 
Indonesian soldiers who have previously served in East 
Timor and Aceh are now stationed in Papua, and military 
bases are being established everywhere. He describes the 
heavy military presence as being out of all proportion to the 
size of the native population . Bases have been built along 
the land border with Papua New Guinea and along the 
coast. Soldiers can be seen in almost all parts of the 
province, walking around, in trucks or most frequently 
standing in front of shopping malls. · 
Rev. Yoman suggests that special autonomy funds have 
been misappropriated by the military. He refers in 
particular to military operations in Puncak Jaya last year 
On 17 April 2007, the regional military command 
purchased two hectares of land in the village of Kwel, 
Eligobel district, for use as a military base. All along the 
border with PNG, there are military posts guarded by 
soldiers from the Siliwangi division of West Java. There are 
as many as 25 military personnel manning each of these 
posts, according to church observers. 
On 4 May this year, two intelligence officers visited two 
Papuan men and questioned them about their activities in 
defence of the traditional land rights of the Ugimba people. 
The tribesmen denied that their activities had anything to 
do with the struggle for independence. 
The following week, on 11 May, a brigadier-general 
visited Rev. Yoman after he had rejected an invitation to 
visit the officer for a meeting and lunch. The officer would 
not give his full name, saying only that his name was Albert 
and he wanted to invite the clergyman to address the 
Strategic Reserve Board of BIN, the state intelligence 
agency. When two intelligence agents visited a bookshop 
later that day, they asked the shop assistant about Rev 
Yoman and about Papua, whereupon the assistant 
suggested that they could buy some books about Papua. 
A day later, Infantry Colonel Burhanuddin Siagian, the 
Jayapura sub-regional military commander, was quoted in 
the local press as saying that he would destroy anyone who 
Intelligence officers roam the streets in all manner 
of disguises 
betrays the nation. He warned 
people not to demonstrate and not 
to dig up past history. [See separate 
article] 
being financed by special autonomy funds. He also says 
he has evidence that an amount of Rp 2.5 billion (approx 
£139,000) has been diverted to the military, and that the 
Provincial Assembly, the DPRP, has found similar evidence 
regarding an amount of Rp 3 bllion (approx £165,000). 
Given that the Governor has admitted around 90 percent of 
special autonomy funds have been used by the bureaucracy 
without explaining how the money was spent [see separate 
article], these claims merit further investigation. 
At the time of the 16 March 2006 Abepura incident, 
Indonesian intelligence agents killed a 22-year old man, 
Denny Hisage, by stabbing him in the ribs and throwing 
him into a vegetable pond. His relatives were too afraid to 
go to the hospital to retrieve the body for burial, so Rev. 
Yoman collected it and made arrangements for the burial in 
the Abepura General Cemetery. 
Intelligence officers roam the streets in all manner of 
disguises, as shop assistants, street traders, hotel and 
restaurant waiters, cab drivers, bus drivers, civil servants 
and scrap metal dealers. They also disguise themselves as 
ticketing officers at the airports. 
Army battalions were deployed in Wamena. Timika and 
Merauke in 2004, and an air force base was established in 
Biak in 2006. There are military posts in even the most 
remote locations, while the Indonesian air force, AURI, has 
collaborated with Russia to use Biak as the location for 
testing ballistic weapons. Besides having the effect of 
intimidating the local population, the land used has been 
confiscated without fair compensation . 
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New military base in Biak 
The Biak branch of the leading human rights NGO in 
Papua, ELSHAM, the Institute for Human Rights Studies 
and Advocacy, also issued a report earlier this year 
regarding the creation of a new military base on the island 
of Biak. It describes Biak as having a very strategic location, 
near the Philippines and the Pacific Ocean. It is a frequent 
a port of call for foreign warships. 
Some time ago, the US army indicated that it was 
considering purchasing a group of islands called Pulau 
Mapia in the Biak archipelago for use as a military base 
from which to monitor activities by terrorists. But the 
Indonesian government, according to ELSHAM, thwarted 
this move to prevent a foreign country from being able to 
monitor human rights violations. 
ELSHAM argues that, in response, the Indonesian 
authorities immediately sent warships and police patrol 
boats to control an area from which Papuans might try to 
flee abroad in search of asylum. The aim of all these 
manoeuvres, according to ELSHAM, is to prevent Papuans 
from trying to escape from Indonesia. 
People in many places are being given courses by the 
local military. The standard topic is, 'Defence of the State' . 
Women, religious leaders, school children and students are 
all obliged to take these courses. The intention is to recruit 
volunteers willing to work with the armed forces whose 
task it is to persuade everyone to safeguard the integrity of 
NKRI [Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia]. These 
volunteers are paid a salary and supplied with equipment 
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such as cell-phones. These activities by the military have 
succeeded in making people suspicious of each other and 
have even incited horizontal conflicts. 
ELSHAM points out that Papuans declared their 
rejection of OTSUS in 2006 because it has not improved 
their standard of living. While Papuans have repeatedly 
conveyed their views to the Indonesian government, the 
government behaves as if it is unaware of the views of the 
Papuans. Many officials even say that only a handful of 
Papuans want independence. Papuan opposition to OTSUS 
serving coffee. Food for the Russian workers will not be 
supplied locally but brought in from abroad so the local 
economy will not benefit. Already, some Papuans who were 
employed on security duties have been replaced by 
migrants. 
There is also concern about the effect on the local 
population and environment of emissions and pollution 
from the radar and satellite-launching operations. Nothing 
has been done yet to study the likely consequences of these 
activities. 
The military pay particlular 
activities of local NGOs 
The air force has already built 
attention to the living quarters for its personnel 
though local land-owners have 
heard nothing about compensation 
has compelled the military to send more troops to Papua 
where they disguise themselves as street vendors, 
shoeshine boys, and work in photocopy shops and hotels. 
This pervasive presence spreads fear among the people. 
The military pay particular attention to the activities of local 
NG Os. 
On the economic front, there were hopes that OTSUS 
would promote the business prospects of Papuans, and that 
the division of the province into several provinces would 
create new opportunities. But Papuans have become mere 
spectators while the migrants get all the attention . The 
report includes a table comparing activities of the Papuans 
and the migrants before and after OTSUS. The table shows 
that the migrants continue to run the economy and the 
markets. There are spies everywhere so Papuans live in 
constant fear. 
Radar and satellite launching pad in Biak 
In 2006, the local administration was informed of the 
government's intention to set up a radar installation and 
satellite launching pad in Biak in collaboration with Russia. 
Despite the many promises that this would improve living 
conditions in Biak, the local customary council came to the 
conclusion that the impact would be far from positive. 
On the jobs front, Papuans will not be able to compete 
with migrants who will get the skilled jobs, with Papuans 
being employed as messenger boys, office cleaners or 
continued from page 19 
daerah rawan (region of disturbance) because it projects a 
negative image of Aceh for future investors. At the end of 
May, TNI Commander-in-Chief Marshall Djoko Suyanto 
and Police Chief General Sutanto jointly declared that, 
following the signing of the MoU agreement on 15 August 
2005, the rawan status of the region had been lifted and 
that henceforth, Aceh is no different from all the other 
provinces in Indonesia. 
It will be also a tall order to boost the agricultural sector. 
Three decades of conflict destroyed many activities in the 
countryside. Serious efforts are being made by a new 
working group called Aceh Plantation Development 
Authority (APDA) to set up a scheme to help the many 
widows and orphans in Aceh. Some 140,000 hectares of 
land will be made available, in particular for palm oil 
plantations. This initiative was taken in accordance with a 
decree issued by the governor, lrwandi. 
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for their land. A notice-board at the 
site now proclaims: 'This land belongs to the Air Force.' 
A refuelling site for AURI aircraft has been installed to 
keep their aircraft from having to fly to Makassar to refuel. 
Land has also been taken over for an ocean harbour. 
This is seen as being a base for military operations 
throughout the whole of eastern Indonesia. Air force 
personnel are also preventing local inhabitants from 
walking across land that is now being used by the airmen. 
A cry for help 
In their concluding remarks, ELSHAM say that Papuan 
freedom of movement in the area has been severely 
restricted, affecting access to their gardens. Wherever they 
go they are confronted by armed personnel. 
Overall, ELSHAM's report describes the growing fear 
among Papuans as the military presence is increased while 
they feel powerless to do anything about it. The report 
concludes with an appeal to human rights groups and the 
international community to pay special attention to the 
current situation in Papua and especially in Biak. In 
particular, they would like the UN to send a mission to 
investigate recent developments in Papua. 
'We fear that a bloody conflict will erupt between the 
local people and the military, as their patience runs out.' 
Moratorium on logging 
An important decision taken by the governor in June was 
the declaration of an indefinite moratorium on logging. 
This means that both legal and illegal logging will be 
prohibited. While post-tsunami reconstruction in Aceh will 
require a lot of timber, lrwandi has said that if necessary, 
Aceh will import wood or confiscate logs that are already 
available. 
This moratorium will be implemented alongside greater 
efforts to replant forests by local communities who can 
reap the harvest themselves. Governor lrwandi used the 
occasion of this announcement to plant a tree symbolically 
in the Taman Ratu Safiatuddin and the Mata le hills in Aceh 
Besar. The moratorium was greeted with great enthusiasm 
by the environment movement all over Indonesia. 
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Indicted officer threatens 
Papuans 
A senior Indonesian army officer indicted 
on crimes against humanity charges in 
Timor-Leste has threatened to 'destroy' 
Papuans who 'betray' Indonesia. A 
coalition of over 30 international human 
rights organisations has called for the 
immediate withdrawal and suspension of 
the commander of the Jayapura sub-
regional military command (Korem 172), 
Burhanuddin Siagian, and for judicial 
action to be taken against him. 
In an open letter to President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono 
on 28 June [1], the organisations - including TAPOL, 
Human Rights Watch and a number of Papua and 
Indonesia-based groups - expressed grave concern that the 
lives of Papuan human rights defenders and political 
activists may be endangered by the continued presence of 
Col. Siagian as commander of Korem 172. 
They accused Indonesia of lacking commitment to 
justice and accountability by not complying with its 
obligations under international law and 'Indonesian 
domestic law to prosecute Col. Siagian for his alleged 
crimes. It had failed to extradite him to Timor-Leste for trial 
and instead had promoted him and appointed him to 
command a large military unit within a highly sensitive area, 
they pointed out. 
In a statement issued by the organisations on the same 
day [2], Paula Makabory, spokesperson for the Institute for 
Human Rights Study and Advocacy, ELSHAM, in West 
Papua said: 'It is shocking that a government supposedly 
committed to military reform and fighting impunity would 
appoint an indicted officer to a sensitive senior post in 
Papua'. 
'Papuans will continue to have their rights trampled on 
until the civilian authorities exert control over military 
behaviour and ensure accountability for past abuses,' she 
added. . 
The organisations urged the Indonesian government to 
review all evidence against Col. Siagian and other high-
level Timor suspects to determine whether proceedings 
should be commenced and to extradite to Timor-Leste 
those indicted by Dili's Special Panel for Serious Crimes. 
According to a report in the Cenderawasih Pos on 12 
May 2007, Col. Siagian promised that: "If I meet anyone 
who has enjoyed the facilities that belong to the state, but 
who still betrays the nation, I honestly will destroy him". 
The statement was reportedly made in response to 
demands by students and youths for a review of the 
discredited 1969 Act of Free Choice and a new referendum 
on self-determination. 
A month later, Col. Siagian vowed to crush any struggle 
or activity which 'tends towards separatism' and declared 
he was not afraid of human rights [Cenderawsih Pos, 7 July 
2007). 
These threats to Papuan activists echoed similar 
statements allegedly made by Col. Siagian when based in 
Maliana as commander of the Bobonaro district military 
command in Timor-Leste (then East Timor). Those 
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statements appear to have led directly to the deaths of a 
number of Timorese civilians. 
Crimes against humanity charges 
According to indictments issued by the Serious Crimes 
Panel on 3 February 2003 ('the Cailaco indictment') and 10 
July 2003 ('the Maliana indictment') [3] , Col. Siagian made 
public speeches threatening to kill supporters of East 
Timor's independence and was responsible for the deaths of 
seven men in April 1999 [4]. 
He is charged with individual responsibility and 
command responsibility for the crimes against humanity of 
torture, murder, persecution , and deportation or forcible 
transfer of a civilian population. 
Col. Siagian is also thought to have been responsible for 
the creation of the Bobonaro militia system that became 
one of the most repressive in the whole of East Timor. He 
is named as a suspect in the report of Indonesia's own 
Commission of Investigation into Human Rights Violations 
in East Timor (Komisi Penyelidik Pe!anggaran HAM di 
Timar Timur, KPP-HAM), which investigated human rights 
abuses in Timor-Leste during the period from 1 January to 
25 October 1999. 
Cycle of impunity stalls reform 
In their letter, the organisations expressed dismay that 
'Indonesia's failure to hold Col. Siagian and others to 
account encourages military personnel to believe they will 
continue to escape justice for serious crimes and seriously 
undermines Indonesia's progress towards becoming a 
country that fully respects human rights and the rule of 
law.' 
'This fai'lure of accountability, and the continued active 
service in positions of command responsibility of senior 
officers accused of serious crimes, are indicative of a 
structural problem of impunity within the Indonesian army 
(TNI) and a lack of political will to address the problem that 
have not been addressed since the TNI withdrew from East 
Timor,' they said. 'Meaningful military reform will not be 
possible until serious efforts are made to end this cycle of 
impunity.' 
The organisations also argued that, irrespective of his 
record in East Tinror, Col. Siagian is entirely unsuited to the 
sensitive position of Commander of Korem 172. The 
Indonesian government's commitment to the peaceful 
resolution of the Papua conflict is clearly undermined by 
belligerent statements by local military commanders, they 
suggested. 
They pointed out that those who campaign peacefully 
for Papuan self-determination are not 'betraying' Indonesia 
as alleged by Col. Siagian; they are simply asserting their 
right to express their political views. They expressed the 
hope that President Yudhoyono would support the Papuans 
right to do that. 
Indonesia's reponse 
Indonesia's response to the calls for action to be taken 
against Col. Siagian simply underlined the fact that it lacks 
the political will to tackle impunity. Speaking on The Wire, 
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a daily current affairs program broadcast on over 150 
community rad io stations around Australia, on 2 July, Dino 
Kusnadi , spokesperson for the Indonesian Embassy in 
Canberra, denied any knowledge of the indictments against 
Col. Siagian. He questioned the legitimacy of the charges, 
saying that there had been a lack of co-operation with the 
Indonesian authorities and that the Dili court had no 
jurisdiction over Indonesia. 
Paula Makabory, also interviewed by The Wire said: 'If 
the Indonesia government under SBY wishes to do military 
reform, the first step is to bring those indicted in East Timar 
cases for crimes against humanity before the court and 
secondly to give a space to the West Papuans or civil 
society groups to express themselves freely.' [5J 
A disturbing pattern 
Col. Siagian is not the only person accused of serious crimes 
in East Timar who has continued in an active position of 
command responsibility. In April this year, Major General 
Noer Muis, former military commander of East Timar, 
controversially co-directed a joint military training exercise 
with the United States [6]. In 2003, Timbul Silaen was 
appointed Papua's police chief despite being indicted on 
charges arising from his occupation of the same position in 
East Timar in 1999 [7]. A number of senior suspects, 
including Major-General Adam Damiri former military 
commander of the East Timar region, were involved in 
military operations in Aceh [8] [9]. 
Indonesia's ad hoc human rights court tried 18 
defendants (not including Col. Siagian) on charges relating 
to crimes against humanity in East Timar, but the 
proceedings were widely regarded as a sham. Twelve 
defendants were acquitted and five had their convictions 
overturned on appeal. The only conviction still standing is 
thatof East Timorese militia leader, Eurico Guterres. The 
UN-established serious crimes process in East Timar 
indicted 392 suspects, but Indonesia refused to co-operate 
and more than 70 per cent of those indicted, including all 
the non-East Timorese nationals, remain free in Indonesia. 
Notes: 
1 . The text of the letter is available at 
http://tapol.gn.apc.org/news/files/leto70628.htm 
2. See http://tapol.gn.apc.org/press/files/pr070628.htm 
3. Available at http://jsmp.minihub.org/indictments 
pdf /Cailacoindnannexeng07feb03 and 
http: I /jsmp. minihu b .o rg/indictmentspdf I Maliana_Burh 
anuddin22_7 _03.pdf 
4. Joao Evangelita Lima Vidal, Carlita Mau Leto, 
Domingos Resi Mau, Paulino Soares Antonio Soares, 
Jose Pau Lela, Antonio Soares, and Manuel Maulelo 
Araujo. 
5. Downloads of The Wire interviews are available at 
http://www.thewire.org.au/daydetail.aspx?SearchDay 
=2007 -07 -02 
6. See http://www.etan.org/news/2007 /04muis.htm 
7. See http://tapol.gn.apc.org/press/files/pr050620.htm 
8. See Human Rights Watch briefing paper, Aceh Under 
Martial Law: Can These Men Be Trusted to Prosecute 
This War, October 2003 at 
http://hrw.org/backgrounder/asia/indonesia1003 .htm 
9. Further information about the roles of these suspects 
and Col. Siagian can be found in the Masters of Terror 
database at 
http://www.villagechief.com/mot/index.htm 
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US Congressman 
banned front Papua 
The Indonesian government has banned 
US Congressman Eni Faleomavaega from 
travelling to West Papua. He was 
planning to attend a meeting of the 
Dewan Adat Papua (Papua Customary 
Council) in Jayapura on 5 July. 
Thaha Al Hamid, Secretary-General of the Papuan 
Presidium Council, said the ban 'just shows that Papua 
is a closed territory under special protection for political 
reasons. This shows that Jakarta knows that there are 
problems there and they do not want to resolve them' 
[unsourced report, 4 July 2007] 
In a statement issued on 3 July, TAPOL described the 
move as a setback for democracy in West Papua. 
'Greater openness and freedom of movement are 
essential for the achievement of peace, democracy and 
improved respect for human rights ·in West Papua,' it 
said. 
'Unfettered access to West Papua for international 
parliamentarians, diplomats, journalists and human 
rights organisations will lead to a better understanding 
of the situation in the territory and greater accuracy in 
reporting. That must be to the benefit of the 
Indonesian government. Restrictions on access are 
counter-productive and lead to the suspicion that the 
government has something to hide from the outside 
world,' it argued. 
Faleomavaega is the Representative to the US Congress 
of the Pacific-Island territory of American Samoa. He is 
a prominent supporter of self-determination for West 
Papua. The Indonesian Foreign Ministry director 
general for European and American affairs, Eddhi 
Hariyadhi, said he would not be allowed to go to 
Papua because his visit would be 'exploited by certain 
groups to create riots' [The Jakarta Post, 3 July 2007]. 
'The reason given for the ban is entirely spurious and a 
sign of Indonesia's uncertain commitment to 
fundamental freedoms," said TAPOL. It pointed out 
that peace was achieved in Aceh thanks in large part to 
the opening up of the province to the international 
community following the tsunami tragedy in December 
2004 
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Tangguh: enduring problems 
As BP's Tangguh liquefied natural gas 
project approaches its operational phase in 
late 2008, a clearer picture is emerging of 
the longer-term pro&lems likely to affect 
local people and the environment around 
Bintuni Bay. These were highlighted at a 
stakeholders' meeting in London hosted by 
BP and the Tangguh Independent Advisory 
Panel (TIAP) on 17 April 2007. 
Responding to TIAP's fifth report, stakeholders, including 
TAPOL and other NGOs, expressed concern about the 
increased military presence in the area, the perceived unfair 
treatment of villagers on the north shore of Bintuni Bay and 
a number of environmental and social problems. 
Militarisation 
involved in Tangguh's security'. Amnesty lnternational's 
representative at the meeting challenged the basis for the 
distinction and urged BP to take on TIAP 's recommendation 
in full. 
BP's approach to the problem seems to be symptomatic 
of its reluctance to address the wider human rights and 
political context of West Papua in relation to Tangguh. 
Social and environmental concerns . 
Although significant benefits have accrued to villagers re-
settled to make way for the production facilities on the 
south shore of Bintuni Bay, tension has been caused among 
non-resettled villagers who feel they have been unfairly 
treated. This applies in particular to villagers on the north 
shore who claim customary rights over some of the gas. 
TIAP expressed concern that it has been visiting the area for 
five years, but BP has not yet made sufficient progress in 
Several participants drew attention 
to the reported deployment of 
Kopassus troops, intelligence agents 
and other non-uniformed personnel 
in the area. They referred to a 
Tension has been caused among non-resettled 
villagers who feel they have been unfairly treated 
November 2006 statement by the Manokwari-based NGO, 
LP3BH, that raised these concerns. The statement pointed 
out that the administrative changes in Bintuni Bay 
consequent upon the arrival of the Tangguh project -
including the creation of a new Kabupaten 
(regency/district) of Bintuni - will result in the establishment 
of a new Kodim (district military command). Construction 
of a naval installation is also underway in Bintuni Bay. 
TIAP, itself set up by BP, acknowledged concern about 
the military presence and undertook to continue 
monitoring the situation, but preferred to play down the 
potential problems. It said the Minister of Defence and TNI 
(military) leaders had denied any increase in personnel and 
the Panel itself had seen no evidence of additional troops. 
The Panel's chairman, former US Senator George 
Mitchell, said Tangguh's Integrated Community Based 
Security (ICBS) programme, which is supposed to avoid the 
use of Indonesian security forces and includes a formal 
agreement with the police, had been ridiculed at the outset, 
but BP had persevered and it was successful. 
Unfortunately, Senator Mitchell largely missed the point 
in his defence of the ICBS. While commendable, ICBS is 
essentially about the micro-management of human rights 
and security issues around the project site; it does not 
address the bigger picture of increased militarisation that is 
an inevitable consequence of a major resource extraction 
operation such as Tangguh. The concern here is about the 
intimidatory and destabilising effect of an increased military 
presence and the potential for provocative actions by 
military personnel sparking conflict in the area. 
The point is partly illustrated by BP's response to a TIAP 
recommendation that all additional forces deployed to 
Bintuni Bay should receive the same human rights training 
that is currently provided to security forces directly serving 
the project. Such training is far from the answer to the 
wider concerns, but BP has sought to water down even this 
modest recommendation, proposing that training should be 
restricted to additional forces 'who could potentially be 
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addressing this issue, which could become another source 
of conflict. 
Environmentally, the major concerns are the impact of a 
massive increase in shipping and other activities in and 
around Bintuni Bay, and carbon dioxide (C02) emissions. 
Around 12.5 per cent of the Tangguh gas reservoir consists 
of C02 , which will be released into the atmosphere unless 
it can be 'captured ', for example by re-injecting it into the 
ground . BP says it is in discussions with the Indonesian 
government on the appropriate C02 disposal mechanism, 
but no agreement has yet been reached. 
One of the main social challenges concerns the 
demobilisation of Papuan construction workers once the 
project becomes operational. Currently around 9,000 
people are employed by the project of whom around 2,500 
are Papuans. Most of them will be made redundant at the 
end of the construction phase as the production facility will 
be maintained by around 500 people only. TIAP highlights 
the need for careful handling of the demobilisation process 
and urges BP to offer training to the Papuans to equip them 
for skilled or semi-skilled jobs so that their future 
employment prospects - with BP or otherwise - are 
improved. 
Transparency 
It is clear that unless full disclosure is made of all revenue 
generated by the project, the Papuans will have no way of 
knowing whether they are receiving their full entitlement to 
a percentage of the Tangguh income under special 
autonomy. A representative of the global anti-corruption 
NGO, Transparency International, objected to a TIAP 
recommendation that detatls of all 'non-confidential ' 
revenue only be made public. He insisted that all forms of 
revenue should be disclosed. The importance of the 
Indonesian government signing up to the Extractive 
Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) was also stressed. 
continued on page 11 
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Customary Council conference 
provokes backlash 
Dewan Adat Papua, the Papuan Customary 
Council, held its second conference in 
Jayapura from 4 till 7 July, attended by 
around five hundred participants coming 
from all parts of the territory. Following 
the meeting, eleven prominent Papuans 
were arrested and subjected to 
interrogation by the police. Although they 
were released the following day, the police 
have indicated that charges of rebellion 
may be laid. 
The Dewan Adat Papua (OAP) was established in 2002 and 
has emerged as one of the two main mass organisations in 
West Papua, along with the Presidium Dewan Papua , 
(Papuan Presidium Council) which came into being two 
years earlier, following a Grand Congress held in Jayapura 
in May-June 2000 which was attended by thousands of 
people. 
Altogether 257 tribes were represented at the 
conference. 
•Another East Tim or' 
As the conference was drawing to a close, several present 
and former Indonesian intelligence chiefs warned that 
Indonesia was in danger of facing 'another East Timor' . 
Morning Star flag. As the performance came to an end, the 
dancers unfurled the flag amid great enthusiasm from the 
audience, who rose to their feet shouting: 'Merdeka, 
Merdeka, Merdeka!' 
Addressing the huge gathering, Tom Beanal who was 
then still the chairman of the Dewan Adat described the 
forthcoming event as a 'festival of democracy'. He went on : 
'This is an occasion for people from all parts of Papua to 
come together, exchange information and give voice to 
their opinions.' He called on the government to open up 
'the tap of democracy' . He said: 'This is a good time for the 
government to sit down with the people ... : Democracy 
should strengthen communication, interaction and 
constructive co-operation among all components of society 
in economic, social, cultural and political affairs to bring 
prosperity and dignity to our lives.' [Cenderawasih Pos, 4 
July 2007] 
The general secretary of the Dewan Adat, Leo lmbiri, 
said that the dance that was being performed 'reflects the 
reality of Papuan lives'. He compared Papuans to children 
who are looking for their parents who have been murdered. 
He said that the dance should not be seen as a political 
manifestation but an expression of the culture of the 
Papuan people. 
Leo said that during the past five years, the Dewan Adat 
had shown that it was participating effectively in the 
Speaking on the day the Dewan 
Adat meeting ended, retired 
Lt.General Hendropriyono, former 
head of BIN, Indonesia's intelligence 
agency, declared that 'the separatist 
As the performance came to an end, the dancers 
unfurled the flag amid great enthusiasm 
movement in Indonesia is spreading' and West Papua 
'could go the same way as East Tim or' . He said: 'They have 
major sponsors and huge amounts of money' and alleged 
that these funds were coming from money that had been 
allocated to finance OTSUS, Papua's Special Autonomy 
status. He claimed that 'separatist movements' had begun 
to emerge in Indonesia since the 1980s. 'If the government 
is unable to handle these conflicts, there is the likelihood 
that Borneo will break away within the coming five years.' 
[Kabarpapua.com, 11 July 2007] 
The governor of Indonesia's Lembaga Ketahanan 
Nasional (National Defence Institute) criticised the 
Indonesian government for underestimating the escalation 
of separatism in Papua and Aceh . Governor Muladi, a 
former chief justice, said : 'The situation in Papua is now 
very dangerous indeed because of their effective 
international networking.' He warned that pressure was 
coming from NGOs in Australia, the Netherlands and the 
USA and that areas surrounding Papua and Aceh 'such as 
Sabang, Medan and Kupang (which is in West Timar) 
should be reinforced militarily' . A squadron of combat 
aircraft in Biak would be a deterrent, both at home and 
abroad. he is quoted as saying. [Report from NOE, 11 July 
2007] 
The Dewan Adat conference was held at the Sports 
Stadium (GOR) in Jayapura. An opening event held on 3 
July was marked by a performance by dancers from seven 
districts who were wearing costumes bearing the Papuan 
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development process and had submitted many 
recommendations to the provincial government. Although 
there had been some responses, he said these responses 
were 'forced'. Ever since the establishment of the Dewan 
Adat five years ago, there had been no formal meetings 
with the authorities.' He said the conference would try to 
find ways of repairing the damaged lives of the people and 
building a new system and then call upon the government 
to work together to build Papua by means of a 
Memorandum of Understanding. (This was clearly intended 
as a reference to the MoU concluded with the people of 
Aceh in 2005.) 
Forkorus Yaboisebut, who was subsequently elected as 
the new chairman of the Dewan Adat, spoke of the human 
rights violations that had occurred in Papua since 1961. The 
basic problems were, he said, first, the denial of political 
rights for the Papuan people, second, development that 
had violated the basic rights and the living environment of 
the people, and third, as a result of all this, the violation of 
the Papuan people's hl\man rights and the rule of law. 
He described the use of the word 'separatism' as a 
violation of language and a legacy from the former colonial 
administration. [Cenderawasih Pos, 4 July 2007] 
Eleven Papuans summoned 
On 7 July, as the Dewan Adat conference drew to an end, 
eleven Papuans, all of whom were members of the 
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organisation's new executive board, were summoned by 
the police. They were: 
Tom Beanal, former chairman of the Dewan Adat Papua 
and present chair of the Papuan Presidium Council (PDP), 
Willy Mandowen, 
Thaha Al Hamid, general secretary of the PDP 
Leo lmbiri, general secretary of Dewan Adat Papua, 
Forkorus Yaboisebut, newly elected chair of the Dewan 
Adat Papua, 
Astrik Rumbonde, first treasurer of the Dewan Adat Papua, 
Yacob Kasimat 
Welem Rumaseb 
Benny Yarisetow 
Alfrida Faidiban 
Asmirah Alhamid , activities treasurer of Dewan Adat 
Papua. 
News of the police action sparked many protests. Eight of 
those summoned were interrogated soon after the 
conclusion of the meeting and the other three were 
interrogated on the following day. One report suggested 
that some of those summoned might face charges of 
rebellion. 
Endemic abuses in 
Central Highlands 
Routine abuses, such as extrajudicial 
executions, torture and rape are being 
committed with impunity 1n the remote 
Central Highlands area of West Papua by 
the Indonesian security forces, most 
notably the police and its special forces 
unit, Brimob, according to a new report by 
Human Rights Watch, published on 5 July. 
The report, 'Out of Sight: Endemic Abuse and Impunity in 
Papua's Central Highlands' argues that the abuse ,is 
deepening mistrust of the national government in Jakarta 
and inflaming separatists tensions. 
One man told Human Rights Watch what happened 
when 12 Br/mob officers arrested him and some friends for 
a peaceful independence flag raising: 
'My teeth fell out. Blood flowed out. I was hit. I was 
kicked twice and then in the stomach twice again. I was 
kicked in the nose, the mouth and the teeth. More kicks 
were ordered and this was repeated. I could not count the 
number of times. I saw all my friends given the same 
treatment. Blood was flowing from them and they were 
forbidden from going to the toilet. They ordered us to 
swallow our blood. My nose was bleeding. They ordered us 
continued from page 9 
Opposition 
A pertinent reminder that there is significant opposition to 
the Tangguh project was provided by a Free West Papua 
Campaign demonstration outside the meeting. In a letter 
to TIAP members, Benny Wenda West Papuan 
independence leader in the UK and Chair of DeMMaK, 
the Koteka Tribal Assembly, compared the gas extraction to 
a robber selling off the contents of his home. 
Senator Mitchell argued in his reply that as the 
construction phase nears completion, support for the 
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Charges of rebellion possible 
The chief of police of Papua, Paulus Waterpauw, later told 
journalists that many people were being questioned in 
connection with the unfurling of the flag. 'There are 
indications that a crime was committed and 14 other 
persons are being questioned as possible witnesses.' Asked 
what the charges would be, the chief of police said 'things 
are leaning towards rebellion (makar)'. Another police 
officer said that attention was focussed on the unfurling of 
the Morning Star flag at the beginning of the conference. 
Police officers had also been sent to Manokwari to question 
members of the Sampari dance group who came from 
there and who were involved in the flag-flying incident. 
[Cenderawasih Pos, 1 and 12 July 2007] 
One of the results of this historic conference was to 
make a clear separation between the Dewan Adat Papua 
which brings together all the different tribes of Papua and 
the Papuan Presidium Council which is a political 
organisation. 
From one source who attended the conference, the 
decisions adopted were: support for self-determination for 
the Papuan people and protection of the indigenous and 
land rights of the Papuan people. 
to swallow the blood again. I do not know the name of the 
officer in command . They all punched us, taking turns.' 
The problem is exacerbated by the government's policy 
of keeping the region closed to outside observers. There is 
limited understanding of the situation in the territory since 
there is little independent reporting on conditions there. 
Reliable information on the Central Highlands, where 
support for independence is strong, is even harder to come 
by. 
'By keeping the region dosed to closed to outside 
scrutiny, officials in Jakarta are receiving biased and partial 
accounts of what is taking place,' said Human Rights 
Watch. 'Reliable information is essential if officials are 
genuinely interested in identifying problems and finding 
lasting solutions.' 
'Conditions in Papua's Central Highlands are an 
important test of how Indonesia's security forces perform 
when political tensions are high and regions are dosed to 
outside observers. The police are failing that test badly,' it 
says. 
The organisation calls for West Papua to be opened to 
independent observers in order to increase the amount and 
quality of information about conditions there and to allow 
independent and transparent investigations to take place. · 
Editorial comment on the report, which is available at 
http://hrw.org/reports/2007 /papua0707 I, was provided 
by TAPOL. 
project grows stronger. He also asserted that support 
increases as one gets closer geographically to the Tangguh 
site because of the benefits accruing to local people. 
A report of the TIAP meeting is available on request 
from TAPOL. TIAP's fifth report and BP's response are 
available at on the BP website. 
Since the meeting, TAPOL has been able to visit the 
Bintuni Bay area. A report will be published shortly. 
A further detailed assessment of the project and its 
impact was published by Down to Earth in its May 2007 
newsletter - see http://dte.gn.apc.org/73tan.htm 
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Visit of UN rights expert 
The Special Representative of the UN 
Secretary-General on Human Rights 
Defenders, Hina Jilani, conducted an 
official mission to Indonesia from 5 to 12 
June 2007. She visited Jakarta, Jayapura in 
West Papua and Banda Aceh. This was the 
first time a senior UN official had been 
permitted to travel to West Papua since 
1969 when a small UN mission was 
present at the so-caHed Act of Free 
Choice. 
During her visit to West Papua on 8 June, Ms Jilani held two 
non-governmental meetings, one with rel1ig,ious leaders and 
one with the human rights NGO community. According to 
the Justice and Peace Director of the Catholic Diocese of 
Jayapura (SKP), Budi Hernawan, the UN representative 
spent 45 minutes with the religious leaders and an hour 
with the NGOs. He said that the time for the meetings was 
limited because most of her time had been spent in 
meetings with the authorities. 
Several peaceful demonstrations were held to welcome 
Ms Ji Ian i's arrival. One held at Sentani airport was disrupted 
by the security forces when an intelligence agent forcibly 
seized a banner bearing the words: 'Stop Genocide in 
Papua'. A female student in the crowd was injured during 
the incident. 
On the same day, hundreds of people held a peaceful 
rally in Manokwari , calling for a referendum for Papua. 
Churchmen intimidated 
In advance of the visit, the Evangelical Church in Papua, the 
GKI , issued a statement drawing attention to violations 
perpetrated against human rights defenders and church 
workers in the recent past. One incident occurred on 1 
September 2006, when the chairman of the working 
local security forces for exposing human rights violations in 
his parish. Rev. Simbiak regularly accompanies members of 
his congregation who have been subjected to abuses. He 
held talks with the local army officers about these abuses 
during the Manokwari case in 1998-2000 and the Wasior 
case in 2001-2002. In 2003, local thugs barricaded his 
office, accusing him of voicing opposition to the carve up of 
Papua. One of the thugs threatened to cut his throat if he 
continued to voice such opinions. 
In its statement, the GKI said that such acts of violence, 
which were far too many to be included in this report, were 
evidence that some groups are determined to disrupt 
attempts to expose abuses and are strongly opposed to 
efforts by the churches to press for just ice. 
UN envoy's many concerns 
Ms Jilani noted in her report on her overall visit to Indonesia 
that several positive steps had been taken to strengthen the 
legal and institutional framework for the promotion of 
human rights, such as Constitut ional changes in 2002 that 
guaranteed human rights and fundamental freedoms, the 
adoption of the Human Rights Act of 1999 and the Witness 
Protection Act of 2006. 
She said that the establishment of Ad hoc Human Rights 
Courts, the National Human Rights Commission (Komnas 
HAM), the National Commission on Violence Against 
Women (Komnas Perempuan) and the adoption of the 
National Plan of Action were important developments. 
However, she had observed serious constraints on the 
functioning of many of these organisations and 
mechanisms affecting their ability to fulfil their mandates 
effectively. 
'There is a resistance to changing attitudes and 
institutional culture which has made it difficult for these 
institutions to make a full commitment to eliminate 
impunity for human rights violations,' she said . 
committee of the GKI Synod, Rev. 
C. Berotabui, staged a protest by 
sitting down and blocking the 
entrance of the Abepura prison. He 
took this action to prevent the 
There is even less commitment to 
impunity for past abuses 
removing 
police from taking away 16 students being held there for 
involvement in the 'Abepura 16 March 2006' incident. The 
night before, there were heated arguments between the 
students and the poilice whom the students accused of 
instigating the 16 March incident during which five 
members of the security forces were killed. Fearing that the 
security of the students would be at risk if they were moved 
away, Rev. Berotabui took action in an attempt to press the 
police to promise they would not be harmed. Following this 
incident, his house was subjected to night-time surveillance 
by unknown persons. On one occasion, these people 
chased a neighbour whom they apparently mistook for Rev. 
Berotabui as he was of a similar build, but the man was able 
to conceal himself and escape capture. 
Several priests who were giving protection to the 
students were subjected to intimidation, bricks were thrown 
at their homes, and they received threatening phone calls. 
Another incident involved Rev. Hofni Simbiak who, for 
the past ten years, has headed the GKI church in 
Manokwari. He has frequently received threats from the 
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And, mindful that there had been no progress on 
several cases she had communicated to the government in 
the past six years, she said: 'there is even less commitment 
to removing impunity for past abuses' . 
Furthermore, she wrote, although 'many of the these 
measures that relate to human rights in general may create 
awareness on the role of human rights defenders and 
facilitate their work .. . they do not address the serious issue 
of their protection'. 
'No concrete initiatives have yet been taken to enact 
laws, to create institutions and to institute procedures that 
deal directly with the protection of human rights defenders 
or with accountability for any harm or arbitrary action 
against them,' she observed. 
Munir murder: A test case 
Ms Jilani highlighted the lack of progress in dealing with the 
killing of Munir in September 2004. She described the case 
as 'a test of the government's will to protect defenders in 
the country' and feared that 'any lapses in the conclusion of 
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this case would make all human rights defenders 
throughout the country insecure'. 
While acknowledging that there were signs the 
government was moving to bring the perpetrators to 
justice, she was 'deeply concerned at apprehensions 
expressed by defenders that the course of justice may be 
influenced to protect the perpetrators of this crime'. 
The worrisome situation in Papua 
The envoy said she had heard many testimonies indicating 
the continuing activities of the police, the military and other 
security and intelligences agencies that are aimed at 
harassment and intimidation of defenders or to restrict their 
access to victims and to sites of human rights violation. 
HUMAN RIGHTS 
unauthorized interference by the police '. Concerns were 
also raised with her regarding the situation of women 
human rights defenders. 
Recommendations 
Ms Jilani strongly recommended the setting up of 
mechanisms to investigate complaints of violations against 
human rights defenders. She urged the removal of 
'restrictive regulations that impede the right of defenders to 
freedom of assembly and of association,' and further 
recommended 'that procedures be instituted to prevent the 
prosecution of human rights defenders aimed at their 
harassment for conducting activities that are legitimately a 
part of their function for the defence of human rights'. 
Defenders are labelled as separatists in order to 
The report of the mission will be 
presented to the UN Human Rights 
undermine their credibility 
These problems, she said, were more pronounced in 
West Papua where she had heard 'credible reports of ... 
arbitrary detention, torture, harassment through 
surveillance, interference with the freedom of movement 
and in defenders' efforts to monitor and investigate human 
rights violations.' 
She was particularly disturbed by allegations that when 
defenders expose abuse of authority or other forms of 
human rights violations committed by the security 
apparatus, they are labelled as separatists in order to 
undermine their credibility.' 
She said that concerns persist despite the assurances 
given to her by the military commander and the chief of 
police in Papua that there was no institutional policy to 
target defenders. 
By contrast, Ms Jilani said she was 'greatly encouraged 
by the improvement in the situation of human rights 
defenders in Aceh'. However, she was informed of cases 
where 'human rights defenders and their activities were 
subjected to surveillance by intelligence agencies and to 
Council, along with 
recommendations for the 
consideration of the government. 
Incidents against Papuans who testified 
Following her departure, several people who had met the 
UN envoy to submit testimonies complained of harassment. 
Three people along with their chauffeur, who left the 
airport in West Papua after seeing the UN envoy off, were 
targeted as they drove away. Frederika Korain, Rev. Perinus 
Koyoga and Bartholomus were returning to Jayapura in a 
SKP vehicle when another vehicle, a blue Kijang, crashed 
into their car. Their car slid off the road before regaining 
equilibrium. They recognised the car as having also been at 
the airport. They managed to halt the car, two men got out 
and said that they were from the Trikora regional military 
command. One of them was FX Subangun, head of the 
intelligence command of Trikora. After a brief encounter, 
the two men fled the scene. By saying who they were, they 
were making no secret of their intimidatory intentions. 
A few days later, on 11 June, Albert Rumbekwan of the 
Papua branch of Komnas HAM, the National Human Rights 
continued on page 4 
Union leader jailed on Labour 
Day 
Marches and demonstrations across 
Indonesia to mark International Labour 
Day on 1 May resulted in the detention 
and ill-treatment of a union leader from 
Tangerang, an industrial city near Jakarta. 
Sarta bin Sarim, a packing worker and chair of the local 
union at a furniture plant named PT Tambun Kusuma 
joined a peaceful demonstration by a coalition of local 
unions. He was later arrested at home for allegedly 
organising the demonstration and taken to the local police 
station. According to reports, when he refused to sign an 
interrogation report, which he stated was false, police 
turned away while other detainees beat and kicked him 
until he vomited blood. Under this duress, Sarta finally 
signed the report. 
Sarta was kept in prison and charged under an old 
Dutch colonial law with committing 'unpleasant acts' and 
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'inciting disruption' . He was repeatedly beaten by other 
inmates demanding money. The police refused appeals by 
the national FKUl-KSBSI union (Federation of Construction, 
Informal and Gener'al Workers Unions) for his release. 
They also refused to provide the union's lawyer with the 
police investigation report, a requirement under Indonesian 
law. 
The treatment of Sarta amounts to a breach of 
Indonesia's obligations under international human rights 
and labour conventions and Indonesian domestic law to 
uphold the rights to freedom of association and assembly. 
A demonstration was held in Jakarta on 24 May to 
protest against Sarta's treatment and the 'death' of Labour 
Day celebrations in Indonesia. 
Sarta was still in custody at the time this Bulletin went 
to press. A further hearing of his case was due to take place 
on 12 July. 
13 
TL\ I OR-LESTE 
- --------- ----· ··-· -
--- --- ---·-- - -
General eledions in a politically 
divided Timor-Leste 
On 30 June general elections were 
held in Timor-Leste, the first ever to 
be held under Timorese law and 
organised by the Timorese 
themselves. No party was able to 
achieve a major1ty, so a coalition 
government 1s the only option. As 
predicted, two contestants, Fretilin 
and the CN RT, emerged as the 
largest parties, with each gaining 
around a quarter of the votes. 
More than 500,000 people voted in the election . 
There were altogether 1,228 polling booths in the 
13 districts . About four hundred international 
observers monitored the voting and security was 
in the hands of about 1,700 UN police and 1,000 
Australian peacekeepers. By 5 July, more than 95 
per cent of the votes had been counted and the 
results were more or less as had been predicted by 
political analysts. Jose Ramos-Horta campaign rally Photo:Elinde 
Support for Fretilin had fallen sharply although 
it won more votes than any other party, with 29 percent of 
the votes. In 2002, the party won 57 percent, and became 
the governing party. The CNRT, a new political group led 
by Xanana Gusmao, came second with 24.1 percent. Other 
parties which did reasonably well were the ASDT /PSD with 
15.8 percent and PD with 11.3 percent. Two new parties 
also won enough votes to get seats in parliament, Undertim 
and PUN with 3.2 and 4.5 percent respectively. An alliance 
of two small parties KOTA/PPT achieved 3.2 percent. 
The results mean that there are two alternatives, either 
a minority Fretilin government with possible support from 
Undertim and KOTA/PPT or, what is more likely, a coalition 
between CNRT, the ASDT /PSD and PD with Xanana 
Gusmao as the prime minister. This coal ition would enjoy a 
narrow majority in parliament, with 37 out of the 65 seats. 
Unstable conditions 
handled up to the time of the latest election. It will not be 
easy to deal with these serious social and political problems. 
Orderly elections 
However, these problems did not affect the presidential 
election in April or the parliamentary elections in June, apart 
from some clashes when two CNRT activists were killed on 
election day. 
The first round of the April presidential election resulted 
in the Fretilin candidate getting the largest number of votes 
but without gaining an absolute majority. In the second 
round, the other parties rallied round Jose Ramos-Horta 
who had come second in the first round . With 70 percent 
of the votes, Ramos-Horta was duly elected as Timor's 
second president. His high profile as a Nobel Peace 
Laureate and the country's foremost campaigner for 
independence for many years had assured him victory. His 
opponent, Lu Olo, was not well known. In any case, Horta 
seemed to be well suited for a ceremonial position; during 
Social and political conditions in Timor-Leste have been 
unstable since May 2006 when 37 people were killed in 
clashes and more than 150,000 
people were made homeless. At In the second round, the other parties rallied round 
least 100,000 people are still living , 
in temporary accommodation . Jose Ramos-Horta 
Meanwhile, the political 
situation underwent many changes. The former prime 
minister, Mari Alkatiri was forced to resign, and Jose 
Ramos-Horta who was then foreign minister took over as 
prime minister until the presidential elections in April 2007. 
Horta was then elected as president, taking over from 
Xanana Gusmao who had been president since 2002 . 
The 2006 crisis in Timar erupted on several fronts and 
escalated quickly. It started with a revolt within the F-FDTL 
(Timorese Defence Force) which was badly handled by the 
Alkatiri government. None of the grave problems, massive 
unemployment, widespread poverty, deep political rifts at 
the top and the ongoing revolt in the army had been well 
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his term as interim prime minister after Alkatiri's resignation, 
he was unable to resolve the many problems dogging the 
country, largely because most of the other cabinet ministers 
were Fretilin members. 
At least 100,000 Fretilin votes had switched to 
supporting Horta, drawn probably by his conciliatory stance 
and aware that he was certainly the best known Timorese 
internationally. As a former Fretilin stalwart, he avoided 
taking a strong anti-Fretilin position in public and remained 
on speaking terms with Fretilin leaders like Alkatiri. 
By May 2006, it became clear that the ruling party 
Fretilin was encountering serious internal problems. Its 
leaders are often portrayed as socialists. Some cabinet 
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Collecting ballot boxes 
ministers including the former prime minister, Mari Alkatiri, 
were often cynically referred to as the 'Maputo Gang' 
because they had spent their years in exile .in Maputo, the 
capital of Mozambique. 
A more mainstream wing composed of the younger 
generation which became known as Fretilin Mudansa, 
contested the Alkatiri leadership but won little support at 
the party's 2006 congress. During the presidential elections, 
Fretilin Mudansa campaigned for the independent 
candidate, Jose Ramos-Horta. His 70 percent majority can 
best be described as a display of anti-Fretilin sentiments 
rather than great enthusiasm for the man himself. 
Power struggle 
The stakes were far greater however at the time of the 
parliamentary elections in June because real political power 
was at stake. 
The political elite in Timor-Leste is divided into two 
camps; one is led by Mari Alkatiri, the head of Fretilin, and 
the other is led by Xanana Gusmao and his political vehicle 
TIM OR-LESTE 
in the eastern part of Timar Leste. In the 
districts of Baucau, Viqueque and 
Lautem, Fretilin successfully won most 
of the votes, while in Dili it won 15 
percent. As a result, Fretilin will take 21 
seats in parliament. 
CNRT, the National Congress for 
Reconciliation in Timor-Leste, was a 
newcomer with barely any 
organisational structure (the party is 
distinct from the CNRT - National 
Council for Timorese Resistance -
alliance that existed before 
independence - see below). It was 
expecting to rely on the charisma of 
Xanana Gusmao, but did not perform 
well, topping the poll only in the capital 
Dili, with 35 percent of the votes. It also 
did relatively well in Liquisa, Bobonaro 
and in the enclave, Oecusse. This will 
give it a total of 18 seats in parliament. 
The ASDT and PSD campaigned 
Photo- Elinde separately in the election but decided to 
join ranks after the results were 
announced . The ASDT is one of the oldest political 
organisations in East Timar and was the forerunner of 
Fretilin. Its chairperson is Xavier do Amaral, who chaired 
Fretilin at the time of the Indonesian invasion in December 
1975. He was captured by Indonesian forces and lived in 
Jakarta for many years. The PSD came into being after 
independence and its chair is Mario Carrascalao, who 
served two terms as governor of East Timar during the 
occupation. Both leaders have a background of cooperation 
with Indonesia. Their coalition will occupy eleven seats. 
The PD, the Democratic Party, came into being soon 
after the referendum in 1999. Most of its leaders are former 
student activists many of whom studied in Indonesia and 
served time in prison in the 1990s under Suharto. They will 
occupy eight seats in parliament. 
The PUN, a new party supported by sections of the 
Catholic Church will get three seats while KOTA/PPT, a 
coalition of two old parties with a strong regional basis, will 
get two seats between them. 
the CNRT. Following its defeat in the 
presidential elections, Fretilin was forced 
to recognise its own vulnerability and saw 
the need for an organisational shake-up. 
Gusmao grew increasingly frustrated because 
he had been unable as to influence policies 
From the start, it was clear that the 
parliamentary election would not resolve this deep divide. 
During the campaign, Xanana blamed Fretilin for all the 
difficulties of the previous four years while Fretiilin sought to 
claim that the CNRT lacked a party programme because it 
had been set up only six months previously by Xanana 
Gusmao to provide him with an electoral vehicle. 
The 12 other parties have much narrower political 
constituencies and depend on ideological differences or 
regional popularity. The 14 political parties which contested 
the election represent a rainbow of differing political views, 
from radical socialist to conservative monarchist and only a 
few of the parties gained enough votes to win seats in 
parliament. 
Fretilin, which bore the brunt of the resistance during 
the Indonesian occupation, is still the only political force 
that has strong roots in Timorese society, the only party 
with a nationwide network of grassroots activists especially 
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A new party called Undertim was established by former 
members of the guerrilla movement. With a strong base in 
the eastern part of the country, it will get two seats. 
Timor's big men 
Under Timer's political system, the presidency is a symbolic 
post while power rests with the prime minister as the head 
of government. From 2002 till 2006, the Fretilin 
government under Alkatiri pursued an austere financial 
policy but nevertheless failed to boost the economy. Alkatiri 
has been acclaimed as a tough negotiator with Australia 
over his country's share in earnings from the Timor Gap oil 
but his cabinet had several fatal flaws. Home affairs 
minister, Rogerio Lobato was convicted of involvement in 
supplying arms to militia units during the 2006 riots. 
Xanana Gusmao grew increasingly frustrated because 
he had been unable as president to influence government 
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policies. Despite his historic role as leader of the resistance. 
his political role was marginal. He therefore decided to 
contest the parliamentary elections hoping to become the 
country's prime minister, which is now very likely. 
the establishment of the CNRT, Xanana left 
Fretilin to become the godfather of the Timorese. 
Jose Ramos Horta, a founding member of Fretilin, 
also left the party. 
In the tumultuous years that followed, in 
particular 1998 and 1999, the pace of events in 
East Timor was breathtaking. President Suharto 
was forced to step down in May 1998, paving the 
way for a historic leap in Timor. In January 1999, 
his successor, President Habibie, agreed to a 
referendum for the Timorese and in August 1999, 
the people of Timor voted overwhelmingly for 
independence. 
Thereafter, Timor became a pet project for the 
UN, which has been involved in Timor under four 
different mandates. The world body is likely to 
remain in Timor for several years yet, perhaps the 
clearest sign of the fragility of the institutions in 
Timor, which have not performed well. 
As political institutions have re-emerged in 
Timor, a range of parties emerged, some old and 
some new. The CNRT, the national coalition 
under Xanana Gusmao, was abandoned and 
Timor-Leste has become a _ 'normal' country with a 
multiparty system. 
Hard as it may be to imagine Fretilin outside 
government, the outcome of the elections means that it is 
Hard as it may be to imagine Fretilin is li1kely to be 
Commentators often argue that 
there are only four important 
political leaders in Timor-Leste: Mari 
Alkatiri, the secretary-general of an Opposition party 
Fretilin, which is still the main 
political force in Timor-Leste; Francisco "Lu Olo" Gutieres, 
chair of parliament and concurrently chair of Fretilin who 
lost against Jose Ramos-Horta for the presidency; Jose 
Ramos-Horta, Nobel Laureate and the newly elected 
president and Xanana Gusmao, former president and 
arguably the best known man in Timor-Leste as leader of 
the resistance against the Indonesian occupation. 
Historical retrospect 
Looking back, all these men were key members of Fretilin . 
Alkatiri and Horta were members of the central committee 
in 1975. Both left the country and became spokespersons 
of Timor independence in exile until 1999 when they 
returned home. Lu Olo and Xanana were Fretilin leaders 
inside the country and in the early eighties Xanana took 
over the leadership of Fretilin, concurrently becoming the 
commander of Falintil, the armed wing of the resistance. 
While Xanana emerged as the guerrilla leader, Lu Olo 
became best known as an underground political leader in 
urban areas. 
In the mid-eighties, while still fighting in the mountains, 
Xanana introduced major strategic changes. A new alliance 
was born that became known in the late eighties as the 
CNRT. This alliance embraced not only Fretilin and other 
political forces like UDT and Apodeti but also made a 
strategic alliance with the Timorese Catholic Church and 
the younger generation, the ones who had grown up 
during the Indonesian occupation. 
This new alliance quickly bore fruit. Internationally, the 
East Trmor issue became very high profile while the 
Timorese youth mounted spectacular actions which enable 
them to hit international headlines. Xanana was arrested in 
1992 and served six years in prison but internationally, he 
became the personification of the Timorese resistance. With 
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likely to be an opposition party. In the coming months, 
developments will show whether the new government is 
able to tackle the burning issues confronting the country 
and in particular, how the oil revenues will be used and 
whether they can bring prosperity to the people, so many 
of whom are now living in abject poverty. 
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Balibo inquest draws to a close 
The inquest into the death of Brian Peters, 
one of five newsmen killed on 16 October 
1975 in Balibo, East Timor, has heard 
testimonies from Australian witnesses 
about the role of Indonesian officials in 
conspiring to kill the men. 
The inquest being held by deputy coroner Dorelle Pinch in 
Sydney was made possible because Brian Peters was 
resident in New South Wales. Delayed for more than thirty 
years, the inquest was finally convened thanks to the 
persistence of Maureen Tolfree, the sister of Peters, and her 
lawyer, Rodney Lewis. 
The five newsmen who were killed were Brian Peters 
and Malcolm Rennie, both from Britain, two Australians, 
Greg Shackleton and Tony Stewart, and a New Zealander, 
Garry Cunningham. 
On 17 May, two Australians testified at the inquest. 
James Dunn, the former Australian consul in Dili, capital of 
Portuguese Timer as it then was, said that, upon his arrival 
in Dili on 8 October 1975, a Fretilin spokesman informed 
him that the Indonesians had occupied Balibo, a town close 
to the border with West Timer, whereupon he wrote a note 
to the foreign minister in Canberra stating that the 
Indonesians knew of the presence of five foreign journalists 
and had decided to kill them so that Indonesian lies about 
their intentions in East Timer would not be exposed. 
Alan Renouf, former head of the department of foreign 
affairs confirmed Dunn's testimony that 'the Indonesian 
army had good reason to kill the journalists'. He told the 
inquest he had waited 32 years to say that he regarded the 
killings as 'revolting, quite unnecessary, cold-blooded and 
really merciless'. He also accused the Australian prime 
minister at the time, Gough Whitlam, of giving Indonesia 
Jakarta governor dodges inquest 
While the inquest was in progress, the governor of Jakarta, 
a former general in the Indonesian army, happened to be 
visiting Sydney on a mission to restore twinning 
connections with New South Wales. Deputy coroner Pinch 
aware that she could not serve a subpoena, decided to use 
a 'small window of opportunity' by inviting the former 
general to give evidence. A summons was delivered to his 
hotel room by officials. The deputy coroner's office denied 
reports that the police had made a forced entry into the 
former general's room. Enraged by the suggestion that he 
should appear at the inquest, Sutiyoso immediately 
cancelled the remainder of his programme and returned 
home on the following day. 
Although Sutiyoso's name had not previously been 
mentioned in connection with the Balibo killings, an 
Indonesian war correspondent, Hendro Subroto, wrote in a 
book that then Captain Sutiyoso was a member of 'team 
susi', the special forces unit that attacked Bai Ibo on 16 
October, 1975. [Sydney Morning Herald, 30 May 2007] 
The incident led to a diplomatic row between Canberra 
and Jakarta. 
War crimes charges 
However, this incident was overshadowed by a 
recommendation from Mark Tedeschi that two Indonesians 
involved in the Balibo attack should be prosecuted for war 
crimes under the Geneva Convention. Although the two 
names were mentioned only in a confidential submission, 
journalists attending the inquest had no difficulty naming 
them as Mohammed Yunus Yosfiah who is known to have 
led the attack on the newsmen in Balibo, and Christoforus 
da Silva, a non-commissioned officer of the special forces 
who later became a district official during the Indonesian 
occupation of East Timer. According 
'At least three of the journalists were shot by to the lawyer, da Silva had trapped 
Indonesian troops acting on an order by Yunus.' 
the fifth newsman who had fled to 
an outhouse where the other four 
were killed. 'When the journalist 
carte blanche to invade East Timer. [Press Release, 
Reporters Without Borders, 23 May 2007] 
Three days earlier, the inquest heard information about 
the death in Dili on 7 December of Roger East, a Darwin-
based journalist who was on assignment from Australian 
Associated Press to investigate the deaths of the newsmen 
in Balibo. An Australian department of foreign affairs report 
was quoted as saying that East's death was directly linked 
to the deaths in Balibo. 
A lawyer appointed to assist the deputy coroner, Mark 
Tedeschi, said in his final submission to the inquest that 
evidence showed that Yusnus Yosfiah, then a captain in the 
Indonesian army and later a government minister, was an 
integral part of the plan to kill the journalists. 'At least three 
of the journalists were shot by Indonesian troops acting on 
an order by Yunus.' He added: 'It is highly unlikely that a 
mere captain would have made the extraordinary decision 
to kill the men without the sanction of his superior officers'. 
Yun us has contemptuously rebuffed a request to appear 
before the inquest. The Indonesian government also refuses 
to collaborate with the inquest because it considers the case 
closed, claiming that the men were caught in crossfire. 
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came out, da Silva stabbed him in the back with a military 
knife,' he said. After a plea in court by John Milkins, the son 
of dead cameraman, Gary Cunningham, for the two to be 
brought to justice, the coroner said: 'Providing there is 
sufficient evidence, you can be in no doubt I will be naming 
people I believe caused the deaths of the journalists.' 
Mr Tedeschi rejected the findings of two earlier official 
Australian inquiries that the men had been killed in crossfire 
during a battle for Balibo between Indonesian-led forces 
and the Fretilin independence movement. On the contrary, 
he said, they had been killed deliberately by soldiers as they 
tried to surrender. [AFP, 31 May 2007] 
'The Indonesian leaders engaged in a masterful power 
play worthy of an international chess grandmaster, using 
Australian leaders and department officers as their pawns,' 
he said. [Sydney Morning Herald, 31 May 2007] 
Relatives greatly encouraged 
Speaking to the press after the recommendation that two 
men be prosecuted for war crimes, John Milkins said: 'It has 
been an incredibly encouraging day.' He said that his 
family's stance had been vindicated. 'I am very heartened 
continued on page 24 
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The struggle for peace and 
democracy in Aceh 
The signing of the Peace Accord, the 
Memorandum of Understanding 
between the Government of 
Indonesia and GAM, the Free Aceh 
Movement, on 15 August 2005 was a 
milestone in the thirty-year conflict. 
The main aspects of the peace 
process have gone well and violence 
has receded. The well-being of the 
people has improved and security 
conditions are relatively stable. But 
peace and democracy need to be 
monitored and promoted. 
Two issues could prove to be stumbling blocks 
threatening the peace process: economic 
developments and the reintegration into society of 
the ex-combatants. They both need time and 
sensitivity from the local government as well as from 
the central government in Jakarta. Election office in Banda Aceh 
Analysts often compare the peace process in 
Aceh with Northern Ireland, but there are some striking 
differences. Whereas in Northern Ireland, the peace process 
took twelve years and numerous meetings between the 
two sides, no more than five sessions were needed in 
Helsinki to reach agreement in Aceh and the whole process 
was completed in seven months. In the case of Northern 
Ireland, much time was spent agreeing on the 
that there was hardly any time to develop new democratic 
organisations and institutions. On top of this, the tsunami 
disaster in December 2004 killed many leading activists in 
the movement and destroyed much of the infrastructure. 
The Acehnese suddenly had to devote their activities to 
physical reconstruction as well as to re-building the political 
framework. 
Arguably the region 
space in Indonesia 
with 
Although the newly-elected 
greatest democratic government of Aceh as well as civil 
society have been slow to introduce 
reforms, many political reforms 
establishment of the institutions, and the economy, paving 
the way for a devolved government. However, the process 
in Aceh went the other way round. During the first phase, 
the framework was agreed after which attention was paid 
to the democratic initiatives and the creation of the 
necessary institutions. Earlier attempts to resolve the 
conflict by simply granting special autonomy had not been 
successful. 
Aceh has become a laboratory of democracy. 
Developments since August 2005 have made it arguably 
the region with greatest democratic space in Indonesia and 
it now occupies a special position within the unitary state of 
Indonesia. 
The Helsinki MoU was a great leap forward. After major 
amendments had been introduced by the national 
parliament, the MoU was adopted as the Law for the 
Governance of Aceh . Despite the many shortcomings, the 
new law, known as UUPA, is unprecedented in Indonesian 
history. However, the very swiftness of the process meant 
that the adoption of the MoU created its own problems. 
The Helsinki peace process began at a time when heavy 
military operations were still underway. Most Acehnese 
activists, including members of GAM as well as those who 
were not members, had to flee either to other parts of 
Indonesia or overseas. The changes occurred so rapidly 
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have nevertheless taken place, 
some of which would be unthinkable in other parts of 
Indonesia. 
The MoU was indeed a breakthrough. GAM abandoned 
their demand for independence and combatants handed in 
their weapons in a series of sessions. Jakarta responded 
very positively and vast sums of money were made 
available for rebuilding and for the reintegration process. In 
particular, the government went ahead with the immediate 
release of 2,000 GAM prisoners, some of whom were 
serving long sentences in prisons all over Java and Sumatra. 
Pilkada, a stunning victory 
The local elections, Pilkada (regional elections), which 
were held on 11 December last year, resulted in a 
resounding victory for independent candidates, that is to 
say, candidates not standing for national parties but who 
were either associated with GAM or were in support of 
independence. The two men elected as governor and vice-
governor, lrwandi Yusuf and Muhammad Nazar, had both 
spent years in prison. lrwandi had escaped from prison 
during the tsunami while Nazar who was being held in 
Malang, East Java, was one of the 2,000 lucky ones to be 
released after the MoU accord. Many of the locally elected 
persons, district chiefs and mayors, have similar 
backgrounds. The man who was elected mayor of Sabang, 
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the biggest port in Aceh, was a former political exile in the 
US while others who were elected were from the ranks of 
GAM combatants. 
The results of the pilkada in Aceh will have significant 
consequences for Indonesian politics. The national parties 
which contested the elections - all of them based in Jakarta 
- were soundly defeated and are still licking their wounds. 
The locally-based parties took the lead everywhere. As 
things stand at present, this cannot be repeated elsewhere 
in country where only Jakarta-based parties are allowed to 
r\CEH 
to the Pidie region, a stronghold of GAM, the second more 
closely linked to the rank-and-file which supported lrwandi 
for governor, and supporters of SIRA, the organisation of 
vice-governor Nazar which was able to mobilise many 
people. However, it would be wrong to say that the 
divisions between the three groups is rigid; individual 
loyalties often flow freely between the three groups. 
On 7 July, the new initiative finally materialised and 
Muzakkir Manaf, former TNA commander-in-chief and 
now a chairperson of KPA, announced the establishment of 
The national parties were soundly defeated and are 
still licking their wounds 
the GAM party. The secretary-
general is Tengku Nazaruddin, who 
is very popular with the GAM rank-
and-file. A rally will soon be held in 
the main stadium of Banda Aceh at 
contest elections. But the Aceh electoral experience has 
opened the way for civil society activists to demand that the 
law on regional elections be amended to allow local parties 
to take part. 
Local parties, a new challenge 
The first party to emerge was Partai Rakyat Aceh (Aceh 
People's Party) which was set up by a group of young 
Acehnese, many of whom have left wing inclinations. The 
first congress of the PRA was very successful; it was 
attended by hundreds of participants from all parts of the 
territory and vibrant discussions took place about the future 
role and political programme of the party. 
The next party to emerge was the Gabthat party 
(Gabthat is the Acehnese word for strong and bold). The 
party came into being on the initiative of several Muslim 
scholars and local GAM activists in Aceh Besar, one the 
districts in Aceh. 
The third party to emerge was a women's party, 
PARAPP (Partai Aliansi Rakyat Aceh Peduli Perempuan, 
People's Alliance Party for Women's Affairs). It was 
founded on 20 May and will focus on the struggle for 
woman's rights in Aceh that until now have been largely 
ignored. 
The GAM party 
According to the MoU, it was agreed by all parties that 
GAM would eventually be transformed into a political 
movement. AMM, the monitoring body set up after the 
MoU, strongly urged the GAM leadership to go ahead on 
this as quickly as possible, but by the time the mission had 
completed its work on 15 December, the party had not yet 
been set up. 
At a meeting of the GAM majelis (parliament) held 
before the local elections, it was clear that no agreement 
had been reached within GAM. After a series of discussions 
and disagreements, lrwandi and Nazar won overwhelming 
support to stand for the positions of governor and vice-
governor. But they did not have the support of the old 
GAM leadership, including those who had been in exile in 
Sweden. 
The rift that occurred after the elections was also 
reflected in many institutions where GAM was represented, 
including the reconstruction body BRR, the reintegration 
body BRA, and KPA - Komite Peralihan Aceh, Transitional 
Committee of Aceh - the new name of the former guerrilla 
army of GAM, which was formerly known as the TNA 
(Tentara Nasional Aceh, National Army of Aceh). 
In the early part of this year, it looked as if three parties 
would emerge, each supported by different fractions within 
GAM, the first consisting of the old guard, generally linked 
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which the new party will be presented to the public. The 
composition and structure of the party appears to have 
been well thought out. Besides the Maje/is Pusat (Central 
Council) there is also a Maje/is Tuha Peut (Advisory 
Council) and management boards at village level called 
Maje/is Tuha Delapan Sagoe, each consisting of eight 
people. 
It is too early to say whether the different views can all 
be accommodated within the GAM party. One GAM 
stalwart, Tengku Usman Lampoh Awe, has insisted that 
there will only be one local GAM party and moves to set up 
another party would be seen as an act of betrayal. 
There was much discussion about the name of the party 
and the final decision was to use the word GAM. However, 
this is no longer intended as an abbreviation of 'Free Aceh 
Movement' but simply using what has become a well-
known word among the Acehnese. But there have already 
been some rumblings in Jakarta expressing discomfort 
about using such a politically-loaded name and it is too 
early to say whether the authorities in Jakarta and the 
leadership of the military and police will agree to this name 
being used. 
The lrwandi government 
The lrwandi government has now been in power for more 
than a 100 days and several NG Os have been assessing its 
performance. Previous local governments in Aceh have 
been riddled with corruption. The new lrwandi-Nazar team 
will certainly face the same problem, having to work with a 
weak and corrupt bureaucracy. A great deal of money has 
been allocated to Aceh, especially because there was a 
huge international response to calls for assis.tance for a 
programme of reconstruction after the tsunami. The new 
government will need to work hard to prevent corruption 
and transparency and accountability will be buzz words for 
the lrwandi government for a long time to come 
In June it was reported that 62 alleged corruption cases 
inside BRR have been reported to KPK, the central body 
that was set up in Jakarta to eradicate corruption. The BRR 
which is the principle agency responsible for reconstruction 
in Aceh is run from Jakarta. Kuntoro, who is the head of 
BRR, has also complained about malfeasance by 
contractors in the rebuilding of houses. An estimated 7 
percent of the contractors have been accused of 
unacceptable levels of re-building or of abandoning their 
projects altogether. 
There has been a strong focus on boosting the economy 
and Governor lrwandi Yusuf complained quite rightly in the 
first weeks of his administration that the central 
government in Jakarta should repeal Aceh's status as 
continued on page 6 
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Maluku dancers spring a 
• surpnse 
A brief presidential visit to Ambon on 29 
June turned into a major embarrassment 
for the President when a group of dancers 
staging a performance in his presence 
suddenly unfurled the RMS frag. The 
incident thrust the issue of Maluku back 
into the limelight, in the presence of 
members of the diplomat corps and the 
world's media. 
RMS stands for Republik Maluku Selatan (South Maluku 
Republic). The movement was established on 25 April 1950 
but crushed by a major military operation. The movement 
continued with an armed struggle on the island of Seram 
but its leader, Soumokil, was captured . Many years later, in 
1966, he was executed. 
Since the early 1950s, the RMS has continued as a 
political movement, with a strong component in the 
Netherlands where a large Malukan community has been 
living since 1950. For many years since the fall of Suharto 
in May 1998, 25 April has been marked as the anniversary 
of the proclamation of the RMS. It has been an occasion to 
fly the Malukan flag as a peaceful reminder of support for 
the RMS. 
The peaceful incident took the President's entourage 
completely by surprise and led to recriminations among the 
security forces for this highly-public re-emergence of one of 
Indonesia's simmering regional conflicts. Thirty-one people 
were detained amid clamours, coming from among others 
Vice-President Jusuf Kalla, for them to face charges of 
treason . According to reports at the time, 28 of those 
arrested were 'protestors' while three others were caught in 
the round-up. Subsequent reports say that the number of 
people under arrest has increased to 38. 
The purpose of the President's visit to Ambon, the 
capital of Maluku, was to mark National Family Day. While 
the governor of Maluku, Karel Albert Ralahalu was 
delivering a speech, a number of people rushed onto the 
field where the ceremony was being held . They began to 
perform a traditional dance, the 'cakalele', which 
continued, according to press reports, for about fifteen 
minutes. Press reports describe the performance as 
'unscheduled' but it was apparently allowed to continue for 
some time as there was confusion about who the dancers 
were. Then one of dancers pulled a large RMS flag out of 
a drum and was about to hold it aloft when it was grabbed 
by security personnel. 
According to press reports four days after the event, the 
38 people were being held by Special Detachment 88 of the 
Indonesian police. According to a statement by FKM, the 
Front Kedaulatan Maluku (Maluku Sovereignty Front), 
those still under arrest by detachment 88 were 'constantly 
severely abused. During night time, the prisoners are kept 
awake with cold water. The prisoners are constantly 
interrogated and beaten without any regard for their basic 
human rights.' 
On 5 July, it was reported that the police had mounted 
a hunt for a man named Simon Saiya who is alleged to have 
been the organiser of the dancers' protest. (His name is in 
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fact included on the list of protesters now under arrest.) The 
spokesman for the Maluku police force, Commander 
Djoko Susilo who is in charge of the crackdown, admitted 
that at the meeting when the protest was planned, 'the 
activists were urged to use peaceful action, not violence, in 
the struggle for independence' . [The Jakarta Post, 5 July 
2007] 
Immediately following the incident, President Susilo 
Bambang Yudhoyono rejected 'any attempt to contest the 
unitary republic' . Vice President Jusuf Kalla, who was also 
with the presidential party, went on record to insist that the 
RMS did not pose a serious threat to the country's unity. 
[The Jakarta Post, 30 June 2007] 
A troubled history 
Maluku which is composed of hundreds of islands is located 
between West Papua to the east and Sulawesi to the west. 
It was one of the richest prizes in the early years of the 
Dutch colonisation of Indonesia. Not long after the Dutch 
landed in Ambon at the end of the 16th century, the Dutch 
East Indies Company established a monopoly over the trade 
in spices - nutmeg, mace and doves - for which Maluku 
was famed at the time. One historian has written: 
'The history of the Moluccas is one of forced labour, of 
forced supplies, of abominable punitive expeditions (hongi) 
against those area which did not respect the Company's 
monopoly, of the felling of clove trees and the deportation 
of vast areas.' [See The South Moluccans by Ben Van 
Kaam, p.9] 
Under Dutch rule, there were many divisions between 
the Muslim and Christian communities. Many Christians 
were recruited into the Dutch colonial army, KNIL. After the 
Dutch withdrew from Indonesia in early 1951, many 
Malukans, particularly those who were members of the 
Dutch army, left Indonesia for The Netherlands and now 
form a community of many thousands. From time to time, 
these Malukans have organised protest actions, the most 
notable being a series of train hijackings in the 1980s 
organised by frustrated representatives of the succeeding 
generation . 
During the Suharto era when the security forces 
maintained a tight grip throughout the country by means of 
authoritarian repression, little was heard of any actions in 
Maluku, but after his downfall, some extremely violent 
clashes occurred, resulting in heavy loss of ilife, with tens of 
thousands of people fleeing their homes. 
The Maluku archipelago has a population of a little 
more than two million people, composed of Muslims and 
Christians in roughly equal numbers. As with many other 
parts of Indonesia, it has also been the destination for many 
people from other parts of the country, in search of better 
prospects. 
In January 1999, fighting broke out between the two 
communities in Central Maluku. The clashes were triggered 
by what appears to have been a trivial dispute that quickly 
erupted into fighting during which dozens of people were 
killed . The government of the time, led by Abdurrahman 
Wahid, popularly known as Gus Dur, was powerless to stop 
continued on page 24 
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LAND CONFLICTS 
Land conflid ends in bloodshed 
Disputes over land ownership and use 
have flared in many parts of Indonesia, 
bringing residents mto physical conflict 
with local security forces. In one case, in 
East Java, members of the marines opened 
fire on villagers. Four people were shot 
dead and a fifth was fatally wounded. It 
appears that military are trying to flex their 
muscles on an issue that goes to the heart 
of millions of peoples' livelihoods, their 
right to land. 
The killings occurred in the village of Alas Tioga, Pasuruan 
district, East Java when a group of marines opened fired on 
villagers who refused to leave the land which they have 
been tilling for many years. Among those killed were a 
pregnant woman and her three-year old son. Eight others 
were wounded. The marines claimed that they were trying 
to relocate the villagers since 2006 in order to use the area 
for combat training. 
The officer in charge of the attack, Marine Corps 
Commander, Major General Safzen Noerdin, has since been 
Disputes take years to resolve 
According to Raden Herlambang Perdana Wiratraman, an 
academic who has undertaken research into military-civilian 
land disputes, each side claimed to have strong proof of 
their ownership rights; the disputed land involved residents 
in eleven villages. When the military attempted to relocate 
the villagers, some resisted. They included Alas Tioga 
residents who decided to take their case to court. It is now 
under consideration by the East Java High Court. 
Wiratraman said in an interview with The Jakarta Post, 
that according to witnesses, when the shooting occurred, 
the villagers were not involved in any protest. They were 
just milling around when some heavy machinery owned by 
PT Rajawali Nusantara, a company under contract with the 
navy, arrived on the scene and was just starting to dig up a 
plot owned by the residents. Wiratraman told the press that 
he had good reason to be.lieve that the shooting had been 
planned but could not say who had given the order. 
He said that a local BPN official had testified in court 
that the land in dispute was legally owned by the residents, 
but he was subsequently removed to another city for no 
apparent reason. 
removed although the navy chief of 
staff denied that this was in any There were systematic efforts by the military to 
way related to the shooting. 
Thirteen members of the marines 
have been arrested and may soon 
seize people's land using harsh approaches 
face trial. 
Major-General Noerdin has been moved to a new post 
at armed forces headquarters. The military have set up an 
inquiry team but non-military observers are cynical about 
the outcome of an inquiry conducted by the military. As so 
often happens, low-ranking soldiers could face punishment 
while the officer responsible is simply moved to another 
post. 
This conflict is one of an estimated 2,81 O land disputes 
across Indonesia, according to the National Land Agency 
(BPN). The head of the agency, Joyo Winoto, said that this 
figure does not take into account many thousands of 
smaller conflicts. 
It was claimed that the marines opened fire because the 
villagers were 'unruly' and were throwing rocks and stones 
at them but this has been firmly denied by witnesses. In any 
case, there can be no justification for firearms to be used 
against unarmed villagers and moreover, since 2002, any 
riotous situation is a matter for the police, not the military. 
The National Human Rights Commission has also 
launched an inquiry. Its chief, Garuda Nusantara said there 
were wide concerns over the military's use of violence to 
resolve conflicts with civilians across Indonesia. 
Vice-President Jusuf Kalla has weighed in on the side of 
the marines, arguing that the military training centre could 
not be moved to any other location because one of the 
navy's bases is in East Java. His intervention was rejected by 
Alas Tlogo village head Jmam Subnadi, who challenged the 
vice-president to visit the area and see for himself that more 
than 1,000 families call the area their home. [The Jakarta 
Post, 4 July 2007) 
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Wiratraman said that back in 2002, when he was on the 
staff of the Legal Aid Institute (LBH) in Surabaya, he 
conducted research into 25 land disputes with the military, 
together with human rights lawyer, Munir, including the 
Alas Tioga case. He said that their study had indicated that 
there were systematic efforts by the military to seize 
people's land using harsh approaches. He said the best way 
forward in this case was for the government to expropriate 
the disputed land, hand it over to those entitled to it, and 
to transparently investigate the shooting. [The Jakarta Post, 
2 July 2007] 
According to an earlier press report, the Indonesian 
navy purchased the land in 1960, at a time when dealings 
with the military usually involved intimidation and 
repression. 
Two other land disputes have involved violent clashes. 
One was in Ambon, Maluku, where an air force unit 
clashed with residents. Earlier this year, on 22 January, 
residents in Rumpin, Bogor, West Java, were involved in a 
brawl with members of the air force, during which one 
resident was shot dead and two others were wounded. 
Legacy of the Suharto era 
Residents living near a military housing complex in Paris 
Gunung Selatan, Depok, West Java are demanding 
settlement for land which they say was taken from them in 
the 1980s by the army. Another case dating back to the 
1980s involves land in Jonggol, near Bekasi, when the 
army's special forces took over a plot of land to build 
houses for their families. Then there are farmers who have 
tried to reclaim their land in Tapos, West Java, that was 
taken from them by Suharto. They acted soon after he was 
forced to stand down in May 1998. 
continued on page 23 
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US Congress unimpressed by 
military refonn 
The US House of Representatives has made 
an important statement about the sluf?gish 
progress of military reform in Indonesia by 
proposing new conditions on the release of 
funds for military assistance. 
State Department reports on steps taken by the 
Indonesian government on accountability for serious 
crimes, the divestment of military (TNI) business interests, 
increased T'NI transparency, and the removal of restrictions 
on access to West Papua will be required before funds can 
be made available in full for Foreign Military Financing 
(FMF) and International Military Education and Training 
(IMET) . 
The conditions are included in the Foreign Operations 
Appropriations Bill (H.R. 2764), passed by the House in 
June, for the financial year ending 30 September 2008. 
They were initiated by Democratic Representative Nita 
Lowey (NY) who heads the House Appropriations 
Subcommittee on Foreign Operations. The Bill must now 
be cons,idered by the Senate before it becomes law. 
The Committee on Appropriations recommended a total 
FMF prQgramme for Indonesia of $8 million, barely just 
over half the Bush administration's requested amount of 
$15.7 million. The reporting requirements apply to $2 
million of the $8 million FMF funds and to all the funds 
allocated to IM'ET. 
A separate provision requires the Secretary of State to 
submit a report on the use of US-supplied equipment by 
the Indonesian security forces and any connection to 
human rights violations since 2000. Connections between 
US-trained security personnel and human rights violations 
and any strategy linking US military assistance to progress 
on human rights must also be noted in the report. 
the Indonesian military (TNI) . Jakarta's failure to pursue 
effective reform underscores the need for the U.S. to use 
the only real leverage it has to press for change - strong and 
binding restrictions on military assistance.' 
Reporting requirements 
According to the Bill, the release of the $2 million FMF 
funds will be delayed until the State Department reports on 
steps taken by the Government of Indonesia on the 
prosecution and punishment of armed forces personnel 
'credibly alleged to have committed gross violations of 
human rights'; on cooperation by the armed forces with 
'civilian judicial authorities and with international efforts to 
resolve cases of gross violations of human rights in East 
Timar and elsewhere; and on reforms to increase the 
transparency and accountability of military operations and 
financial management'. 
IMET funding is delayed until the Secretary of State 
reports on steps taken by Indonesia 'to deny promotion to 
and to remove from service military officers indicted for 
serious crimes'; Indonesian government responses to 
Timor-Leste's Commission for Reception, Truth and 
Reconciliation; implementation of the 2004 Indonesian law 
requiring the Indonesian military to divest itself of 
businesses; and the removal of restrictions on travel to West 
Papua. 
A long way to go 
Despite some progress, military reform still has a long 
way to go. The TNl's attachment to the belief that it is the 
only institution capable of protecting the unitary state of 
Indonesia remains a substantial obstacle. This is allied to a 
strong distrust of civilian politicians and a willingness to use 
excessive force, in the expectation of impunity, to maintain 
'the Bush administration appears to have no real 
strategy to promote basic reform of the TNI' 
the country's territorial integrity. 
The TNl's traditional reliance on 
business activities for around 50 per 
cent of its income is another major 
stumbling block . It is an 
These moves highlight ongoing tensions between the 
Bush administration and Congress on the question of 
Indonesian military reform . In November 2005, a 
Congressional vote to make FMF conditional on 
improvements in the TN1's record was controversially 
vetoed by a national security waiver that enabled the 
administration to restore full military ties [see TAPOL 
Bulletin No 181, p. 21]. 
At the time, the State Department pledged to 'carefully 
calibrate' any assistance to the TNI, but according to the 
US-based East Timor and Indonesia Action Network 
(ETAN), 'Instead, the administration's actions have 
demonstrated a policy of nearly unrestrained engagement' 
[ETAN press release 22 June 2007]. 
ETAN, which coordinated the Congressional lobbying, 
welcomed the new initiative: 
'The House appropriations bill highlights many of the 
most needed reforms. In contrast, the Bush administration 
appears to have no real strategy to promote basic reform of 
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impediment to civilian control and oversight and a source of 
tension and conflict with local communities. The 
antiquated territorial command structure of the army -
which provides it with a presence down to the village level 
- facilitates legal and il1legal business activities, especiaHy 
since increased regional autonomy has provided more 
money and political power to the districts. The TNI has so 
far refused to abandon the territorial structure as it has 
become a lucrative money-making machine. In conflict 
areas, such as West Papua, the structure continues to 
afford the military an influential role in political and social 
affairs. 
Engagement a disincentive to reform 
The Bush administration argues that the TNI is a key 
strategic ally in the global 'war against terror'. However, it 
is not clear what US military assistance will achieve given 
the TNl's own reputation for using the tactics of terror to 
continued on page 24 
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Negligent Neighbour: New 
Zealand's Complicity in the 
Invasion and Occupation of 
Timor-Leste 
by Maire Leadbeater, 234 pages, 
Craig Potton Publishing. 
The only complaint one might have 
with this excellent book concerns its 
title, which describes New Zealand as 
• • .... .tA. ( "~'J'foA~ i · IJooil 
-111• .• ..,,.......,,~ lln • 1 .. 1, 
a negligent neighbour of East Timor (now known as Timor-
Leste) during the invasion and brutal occupation by 
Indonesia. 
Judging by Maire Leadbeater's highly readable account 
of her country's role, it is clear that New Zealand's level of 
culpability was far higher than negligence. Its complicity in 
supporting Indonesia's East Timor policy for geo-political 
purposes was in fact on a par with the collusion of the key 
western powers, Australia and the United States. 
Maire Leadbeater is a seasoned campaigner (she now 
runs the Auckland-based Indonesia Human Rights 
Committee and is a prominent advocate for West Papua). 
Her personal recollections and experiences in the East Timor 
solidarity movement add considerable strength and 
authenticity to her chronicle, which also draws on 
declassified official documents, historical research and 
interviews with key players. 
Underpinning the narrative is the moving story of East 
Timor's heroic resistance against oppression together with 
an informative overview of the history of the East Timor 
tragedy and the Machiavellian machinations of the 
international community. 
The book can make depressing reading for those who 
believe that principle should take precedence over 
pragmatism on foreign policy issues such as East Timor. 
Leadbeater notes how she was shocked to find that 'almost 
every new batch of documents revealed new examples of 
the high-level subterfuge officials relied on as they plotted 
to help Indonesia deflect international criticism'. 
However, there is some encouragement for activists in 
the discovery from official papers that 'solidarity 
campaigning had made more of an impact on Government 
officials and politicians than any of us had been aware of at 
the time. It is clear that Government officials were 
constantly gauging the strength of the solidarity movement 
and its impact on the public'. 
The book raises the important question as to what 
would have happened if New Zealand had taken a different 
position and opposed the Indonesian invasion and 
occupation. Would that have had an effect on the other 
continued from page 21 
According to The Jakarta Post [6 June 2007], the list of 
such clashes is much too long to detail and is growing by 
the year. 
Another case widely reported in the media concerns a 
plot of land in Meruya Selatan, West Jakarta where 
thousands of people are challenging a Supreme Court 
ruling depriving them of their property in favour of a 
private developer, PT Portanigra. The plaintiffs do not have 
much confidence in a legal system, which they regard as 
being very corrupt, with verdicts up for sale to the highest 
bidder. 
The Supreme Court ruled that the company was 
entitled to 78 hectares of land, including 43.9 hectares 
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global players and forced Indonesia to change its plans, 
Leadbeater asks. What counts, she suggests is 'not just the 
size of the country, but qualities such as a reputation for 
straight dealing and an ethical foreign policy. Deserved or 
not, New Zealand had a good name' in that respect and 
was a strong supporter of self-determination for Pacific 
Islands states. But it 'shamelessly put this "good name" to 
the service of Indonesia' despite the fact that it never 
gained anything from being conciliatory to Jakarta. 
Leadbeater makes the point that New Zealand had 
withstood high-level pressure, including economic threats 
from the United States and Britain, over its anti -nuclear 
stand (an honourable exception to the pragmatic approach 
to foreign policy) so its lack of courage over East Timor was 
all the more regrettable. 
New Zealand's complicity in Indonesia's annexation of 
East Timor is symbolised by its support for the Australian-
led cover-up over the killings of the 'Balibo Five' newsmen 
in October 1975. This is now being exposed by the New 
South Wales inquest into the death of one of the men, 
Briton Brian Peters [see separate article]. The incident is 
regarded as a key moment in the invasion of East Timar 
since the lack of protest over the deaths by Australia, New 
Zealand and the UK is thought to have emboldened 
Indonesia to proceed with its plans. 
Cameraman Gary Cunningham was a New Zealand 
citizen, but Leadbeater notes that the New Zealand 
government, anxious to avoid harming its relations with 
Indonesia, shamefully concluded there was no need for it to 
become involved in the dispute over how the men died. 
The fact that Cunningham was resident in Australia and 
employed by an Australian news organisation was used as 
a convenient justification for it to turn a blind eye. 
Leadbeater presents the book as her way of addressing 
a 'personal responsibility to expose what went wrong in the 
past in the interests of putting things right in the present'. 
She has gone a considerable way to achieving the first part 
of the objective, but the second part is dependent on those 
in power, who may not yet have learnt the lessons of the 
past. 
In common with other western countries, New Zealand 
has offered no apology for 24 years of complicity with 
Indonesian military brutality in East Timar, it has maintained 
close ties with the military forces responsible for widespread 
violations of human rights, and done little to ensure the 
perpetrators of crimes against humanity are brought to 
justice. These failures of national, institutional and 
individual accountability have clearly contributed to the 
recent breakdown of law and order in independent Timor-
continued on page 24 
where more than 21,000 residents have been living for the 
past three decades. 
The land in dispute is adjacent to two TV stations and 
several radio stations and has gained plenty of media 
attention without anyone resorting to physical violence. 
[Jakarta Post 6 June, and Straits Times 25 June 2007.] 
During the more than three decades of the Suharto era, 
the political situation made it far too dangerous for people 
to defend their land rights. They could have been accused 
as members of the Communist Party which had promoted 
the issue of land reform until it was banned in 1966. But as 
many Indonesians are now discovering, little has changed 
since the start of the reform era which followed the fall of 
Suharto in 1998. 
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continued from page 20 
the fighting. It was reported at the time that Laskar Jihad 
units wh ich had been trained in Java were sent to Maluku 
to stir up trouble. 
Sporadic clashes continued to occur up to 2001 , with a 
mounting death toll . By early 2002, the death toll from 
clashes had risen to 5,000 while tens of thousands of 
people had fled their homes, becoming internally displaced 
people (!DPs) . By early 2001, it was estimated that 
approximately half a million people had fled their homes 
because of the continuing violence. Since that time, most 
of these I DPs have been living in poorly equipped camps. 
In 2000, units of the Indonesian army, the TNI, were 
dispatched to Maluku in an attempt to restore order. 
However, the clashes have continued intermittently and 
have resulted in the gutting of churches, mosques and 
schools, and the destruction of many thousands of homes. 
In February 2002, a peace accord known as the Malina 
Accord was concluded but it was criticised by political 
parties and many human rights activists for being a top-
down agreement which failed to involve grass roots 
organisations. 
The more than two dozen people now under arrest and 
facing charges of rebellion or treason for staging a peaceful 
protest are likely to receive heavy sentences. A similar 
action in Papua two years ago resulted in two men being 
given ten and fifteen year sentences, simply for unfurling a 
flag. 
It is not difficult to conclude that attempts to shrug off 
support in Maluku for independence will be of little avail 
and the government would be well advised to avoid 
resorting to harsh repression towards a movement that 
continues to enjoy support in the territory more than fifty 
years after the RMS was first proclaimed in April 1950. 
continued from page 22 
achieve its ends. ETAN suggests that reform efforts have 
all but stopped since the US began to re-engage with the 
TNI. 'Historically, the [TNl]'s worst abuses took place when 
the US was most engaged', it points out. 
Breaking news: 
The Foreign Operations Appropriations Bill has now been 
passed by the Senate Appropriations Committee. It 
approves the full administration request of $15.7 million 
(House - $8million) for FMF and provides for the 
withholding of all but $6 million until the State Department 
issues a report identical to that required by the House. 
Under both versions, an amount of $6 million is free of the 
reporting requirement. 
The Senate Committee also offers an additional $2 
million when the Secretary of State reports that the 
Indonesian government has provided plans for effectively 
addressing concerns relating to strengthening the rule of 
law, military reform including budget transparency, and 
resolving the situation in Papua. 
The Bill must now be passed by the full Senate and 
undergo a reconciliation process between the House and 
the Senate. 
24 
continued from page 17 
but we always regarded them as non-combatants and we 
never understood why there was a sense that they could 
be just heartlessly killed with impunity. ' 
Shirley Shackleton , whose husband Greg was one of 
the five newsmen, and who has campaigned for years 
about the killing of the Balibo Five, said : 'It is a wonderful 
relief to hear it actually said publicly.' 
Following these sessions, the inquest was adjourned 
and was expected to re-convene in around a month's time. 
continued from page 23 
Leste by sending the message that violence pays and that 
perpetrators can expect to enjoy impunity. 
There is, suggests Leadbeater, an opportunity for New 
Zealand to atone in part for its past errors by making a 
difference on West Papua, but it must be 'prepared to put 
principle before the bilateral relationship with Indonesia' 
and 'abandon its acquiescent Indonesia-first foreign policy' 
if the East Timor policy debacle is not to be repeated. · 
Paul Barber, TAPOL 
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